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FRIENDING THE PRIVACY REGULATORS 
William McGeveran* 
According to conventional wisdom, data privacy regulators in the European Union 
are unreasonably demanding, while their American counterparts are laughably lax. 
Many observers further assume that any privacy enforcement without monetary 
fines or other punishment is an ineffective “slap on the wrist.” This Article 
demonstrates that both of these assumptions are wrong. It uses the simultaneous 
2011 investigations of Facebook’s privacy practices by regulators in the United 
States and Ireland as a case study. These two agencies reached broadly similar 
conclusions, and neither imposed a traditional penalty. Instead, they utilized 
“responsive regulation,” where the government emphasizes less adversarial 
techniques and considers formal enforcement actions more of a last resort. 
When regulators in different jurisdictions employ this same responsive regulatory 
strategy, they blur the supposedly sharp distinctions between them, despite what 
may be written in their respective constitutional proclamations or statute books. 
Moreover, “regulatory friending” techniques work effectively in the privacy 
context. Responsive regulation encourages companies to improve their practices 
continually, it retains flexibility to deal with changing technology, and it discharges 
oversight duties cost-effectively, thus improving real-world data practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the end of 2011, two different government privacy regulators completed 
comprehensive investigations of the social networking platform Facebook. Both 
reached broadly similar conclusions about the data-handling practices they 
examined. Rather than imposing a conventional penalty, both regulators reached 
agreements with the company compelling numerous improvements in the treatment 
of personal data. This Article uses the Facebook investigations as a case study of 
global privacy enforcement today. 
The approach taken by both of these regulators was a textbook illustration 
of a form of new governance theory known as “responsive regulation,” which has a 
long pedigree in administrative law scholarship. Using this model, the government 
emphasizes less adversarial techniques and only turns to formal and punitive 
enforcement actions as a last resort if these fail. The Facebook case study illustrates 
how these techniques have been adapted to privacy law. In effect, Facebook and the 
privacy regulators “friended” one another. 
This Article argues that we should understand most privacy regulation 
through the prism of responsive regulation. Doing so illuminates two important 
features of enforcement practices. 
First, the two Facebook investigations reached similar outcomes even 
though they occurred in two different countries with considerably divergent bodies 
of substantive law. In the United States, Facebook came under the scrutiny of the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or the “Commission”), which is a consumer 
protection agency, not primarily a privacy regulator. The other investigation was 
conducted by the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner (“ODPC”) in the 
Republic of Ireland. Unlike the consumer protection law underlying the FTC’s 
authority, the ODPC enforces a data protection regime. The consumer protection 
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approach dominant in the United States and the data protection approach used 
throughout the European Union (“E.U.”) differ greatly in substance and emphasis.1 
But the use of responsive regulation on both sides of the Atlantic blurs the 
supposedly sharp distinctions between jurisdictions, whatever may be written in 
their respective constitutional proclamations or statute books. 
Second, responsive regulation works pretty well. Some observers, 
particularly in continental Europe, have criticized privacy enforcement in Ireland as 
too permissive.2 Austrian privacy advocate Max Schrems once dubbed Ireland “the 
Cayman Islands of the data barons.”3 U.S. regulators are often subject to similar 
disparagement when they close enforcement actions without imposing traditional 
punishments. 4  But the well-established literature on new governance methods, 
including responsive regulation, demonstrates that tough and punitive enforcement 
is not the true indicator of effective law.5 Where prior literature typically focused on 
more industrial-era issues such as pollution control and product safety,6 this Article 
confirms that the model fares well in the digital economy too. “Regulatory 
friending” is especially well suited to the privacy context. It gives companies more 
                                                                                                                
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. See Ian Burrell, Billy Hawkes: The Irishman with a Billion People’s Privacy 
to Protect, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-
and-tech/news/billy-hawkes-the-irishman-with-a-billion-people-s-privacy-to-protect-
9115818.html. 
Joe McNamee of European Digital Rights (EDRi), a civil rights group, 
says the Irish commissioner’s office has ‘little credibility.’ Privacy 
advocates accuse it of practising light-touch regulation. The Irish DPC 
allows companies to ‘do whatever they want with personal data,’ plays 
down the threat of sanctions, and rarely uses enforcement powers, says 
EDRi. 
Leo Mirani, How a Bureaucrat in a Struggling Country at the Edge of Europe Found Himself 
Safeguarding the World’s Data, QUARTZ (Jan. 7, 2014), http://qz.com/162791/how-a-
bureaucrat-in-a-struggling-country-at-the-edge-of-europe-found-himself-safeguarding-the-
worlds-data/. 
 3. Derek Scally, Opinion, High Court Privacy Case Puts Ireland at Centre of 
Data Collection Controversy, IRISH TIMES (June 14, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/high-court-privacy-case-puts-ireland-at-
centre-of-data-collection-controversy-1.1831895. 
 4. For example, one technology blogger reacted angrily to a settlement the FTC 
reached with the makers of the popular social messaging app Snapchat, protesting that “[t]he 
Federal Trade Commission today effectively told technology companies: Go ahead and lie to 
consumers about your privacy protections, because even if you get caught, the most you’ll 
have to do is apologize. (If that.)” Selena Larson, FTC To Silicon Valley: Lying About User 
Privacy Will Get You a Big . . . Wrist Slap, READWRITE (May 8, 2014), 
http://readwrite.com/2014/05/08/snapchat-ftc-wrist-slap-user-privacy. 
 5. See infra Part II (discussing influential new governance scholarship that 
deemphasizes the primacy of punitive measures). 
 6. See, e.g., REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 
2000) (discussing the distinction between adversarial regulation and more cooperative forms 
of new governance, and collecting articles analyzing how these techniques are applied in 
different countries to regulate the environment, employment, and product safety). 
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clarity about their compliance obligations and minimizes their risk of being 
surprised by an adversarial regulatory action in a fast-changing environment. 
Meanwhile, regulators can improve real-world data practices efficiently, flexibly, 
and cooperatively. Since the 2011 investigations, Facebook has greatly improved its 
treatment of personal data, and in certain ways its policies are now exemplary.7 
An assessment of responsive privacy regulation across the United States 
and the E.U. is very timely at this moment for several reasons. 
To begin with, in recent years, the ODPC has become one of the world’s 
most important privacy regulators. Facebook, Inc. manages its relationship with all 
users outside the United States and Canada through Facebook Ireland Ltd., its 
Dublin-based subsidiary.8 For reasons mostly unrelated to privacy,9 numerous other 
global technology companies have also established substantial second homes in 
Ireland, including Google, Apple, Intel, Twitter, and eBay.10 That puts the ODPC at 
the center of the most cutting-edge digital privacy issues. Yet, there has been little 
sustained scholarly scrutiny of Irish privacy law or the ODPC. 
Meanwhile, E.U. data protection law, and therefore Irish law along with it, 
is changing rapidly. In late 2015, an E.U. court case invalidated the U.S.–E.U. Safe 
Harbor Agreement, a legal mechanism used by over 4,500 U.S. companies to 
transfer personal data from the E.U. to the United States—potentially subjecting 
many more of them to E.U. enforcement.11 A replacement mechanism, known as the 
“Privacy Shield,” went into effect in mid-2016, but remains untested.12 Also in 
                                                                                                                
 7. See infra notes 338–42 and accompanying text (discussing Facebook’s privacy 
improvements since 2011). 
 8. See infra notes 317–19 and accompanying text (discussing Facebook’s 
significant presence in Ireland). 
 9. See infra notes 194–97 and accompanying text (discussing reasons technology 
companies like Facebook have located in Ireland). 
 10. According to one industry group, “At the last count, 179 companies from the 
[U.S.] West Coast were employing over 36,000 people in Ireland—among them PayPal, 
Twitter, Apple, Intel, eBay, Qualcomm, Oracle, McAfee and Yahoo!.” Thomas Breathnach, 
Silicon Docklands to Silicon Valley, MAKE IT IN IR. (Apr. 2, 2014), 
http://makeitinireland.com/silicon-docklands-to-silicon-valley. 
 11. Not incidentally, the case centered on Ireland’s ODPC. See Case C-362/14, 
Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 614CJ0362 (Oct. 6, 2015); 
Mark Scott, Data Transfer Pact Between U.S. and Europe Is Ruled Invalid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/technology/european-union-us-data-
collection.html. 
 12. European Commission Press Release IP/16/2461, European Commission 
Launches EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Stronger Protection for Transatlantic Data Flows (July 12, 
2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2461_en.htm; Natalia Drozdiak, EU 
Privacy Regulators Give Green Light to Data-Transfer Pact With U.S., WALL ST. J. (July 26, 
2016, 9:33 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-privacy-regulators-give-green-light-to-
data-transfer-pact-with-u-s-1469534432 (reporting qualified approval of Privacy Shield by 
Article 29 Working Party, which is composed of national data protection authorities); Sean 
Hargrave, Is Privacy Shield Already A Dead Man Walking?, MEDIAPOST (July 27, 2016, 
10:24 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/281233/is-privacy-shield-
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2016, the E.U. officially adopted its new General Data Protection Regulation 
(“GDPR”), the most comprehensive overhaul of E.U. privacy rules in over two 
decades.13 The revisions move European statutory law even further from the U.S. 
approach and create enormous new potential fines—but leave most day-to-day 
power in the hands of the same national regulators as before.14 Understanding the 
significance of regulatory style will be crucial to assessing the impact of the new 
GDPR, which will become effective in all E.U. countries, including Ireland, in 2018. 
Finally, this Article is timely because U.S. privacy scholarship has recently 
taken an administrative turn that more closely examines the actual enforcement of 
privacy law.15 More academic authors have begun to emphasize data handling “on 
the ground”16 and to challenge the oversimplified picture of a vast transatlantic gulf 
                                                                                                                
already-a-dead-man-walking.html (expressing skepticism about long-term survival of 
Privacy Shield). 
 13. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679 [hereinafter GDPR]; 
see European Commission Press Release IP/15/6321, Agreement on Commission’s EU Data 
Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single Market (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm; Data Protection Reform-
Parliament Approves New Rules Fit For the Digital Era, EUR. PARLIAMENT: NEWS (Apr. 14, 
2016, 12:11 PM), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20160407IPR21776/data-protection-reform-parliament-approves-new-rules-fit-for-
the-digital-era; Mark Scott, Europe Approves Tough New Data Protection Rules, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/technology/eu-data-privacy.html. 
 14. For further discussion of the GDPR, see infra notes 52–53 and accompanying 
text and notes 398–400 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., ENFORCING PRIVACY: REGULATORY, LEGAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
APPROACHES (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2016) [hereinafter ENFORCING PRIVACY] 
(collecting international scholarship on governance and privacy law); CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY (2016) (examining FTC regulation 
of consumer privacy); Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-
Americanization of European Regulator Styles: The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 411 (2011) (comparing data privacy regulation in four countries); Danielle Keats Citron, 
Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733297 (analyzing privacy 
enforcement by state attorneys general); Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the 
Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369 (2016) (arguing administrative regulation 
has changed to become informal, financialized, and involving increased input from the private 
sector); Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-
Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 439 (2011) (comparing regulatory 
models available for privacy enforcement); Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the 
FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955 (2016) (critiquing FTC’s enforcement 
techniques in data security cases); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the 
New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014) (arguing that privacy attorneys 
and the FTC treat consent decrees like an emerging “common law of privacy”); David Thaw, 
The Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 287 (2014) (using empirical 
methods to evaluate different regulatory techniques applied to private-sector cybersecurity 
practices). 
 16. See, e.g., KENNETH A. BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE 
GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (2015); 
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between U.S. and E.U. law in practice. 17  While there was earlier privacy law 
scholarship in this vein, most notably the classic work of Colin Bennett (alone and 
with co-author Charles Raab),18 serious examination of regulatory enforcement has 
increased considerably in the last three to five years. By systematically analyzing 
responsive regulation as a framework to describe multiple countries’ enforcement, 
this Article contributes to an emerging privacy literature that grapples with the 
mechanisms that turn abstract rules into real-world practices.19 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the legal background that 
shows how the “data protection” model in the E.U. (and specifically Ireland) differs 
from the “consumer protection” model more common in U.S. privacy law. Part II 
introduces the concept of responsive regulation from administrative law scholarship. 
Part III then explores the application of the responsive regulation model to day-to-
day enforcement of privacy law in the United States and Ireland. Part IV gets more 
specific, examining the Facebook investigations as an example of responsive 
regulation in action. Finally, in Part V, this Article concludes by identifying lessons 
that can guide policy development and further study. 
The significance of responsive regulation should not be overstated. The 
considerable differences between E.U. and U.S. privacy law described in Part I 
remain, despite the shared regulatory techniques discussed later in the Article. 
Moreover, while the privacy regulators examined here have adopted responsive 
techniques, others have chosen varying regulatory styles. 20  And responsive 
                                                                                                                
Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011). 
 17. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-US Privacy Collision: A Turn to 
Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013) (applying Anne-Marie 
Slaughter’s theory of international “harmonization networks” to show how U.S. and E.U. 
institutions have engaged each other in a collaborative process of informal lawmaking to bring 
their distinct privacy regimes into closer alignment); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15, at 586 
(arguing that, because of FTC’s increased privacy enforcement, “such comparisons are 
increasingly becoming outdated”). See generally Christopher Wolf, Delusions of Adequacy? 
Examining the Case for Finding the United States Adequate for Cross-Border EU-U.S. Data 
Transfers, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 227, 243–50 (2014) (suggesting that U.S. privacy law 
might properly be deemed to offer the “adequate level of protection” for personal data 
required for cross-border transfers under E.U. law). 
 18. See COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC 
POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992); COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, 
THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY (2003); see also Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy 
Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041 (2000); Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with 
Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305 (2001). For a classic work 
on the formulation of privacy legislation rather than its regulatory enforcement, see PRISCILLA 
M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(1995). 
 19. A new examination by Graham Greenleaf engages in a somewhat comparable 
analysis of responsive privacy regulation in Asia. Graham Greenleaf, Responsive Regulation 
of Data Privacy: Theory and Asian Examples, in ENFORCING PRIVACY, supra note 15, at 233. 
 20. See, e.g., Artemio Rallo Lombarte, The Spanish Experience of Enforcing 
Privacy Norms: Two Decades of Evolution from Sticks to Carrots, in ENFORCING PRIVACY, 
supra note 15, at 123, 131–141 (describing shift in Spanish data protection regulation from a 
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regulation certainly is not some panacea for effective privacy enforcement. Rather, 
regulators typically need to combine various strategies in different situations. All 
enforcement is imperfect: the rules will always be violated by some. 
Nonetheless, the fact that authorities in Ireland and the United States can 
behave so similarly when enforcing such different laws belies the caricature of 
radical difference. This Article offers a more refined portrait: on both sides of the 
Atlantic, some regulators are moving toward pragmatic and flexible governance of 
data practices for the digital age. In the end, responsive regulation might be the most 
effective approach for protecting privacy while enjoying the benefits of 
technological development. Thus, the equivalent results often reached in Ireland and 
the United States are not problematic—they are desirable. Like any good friendship, 
responsive regulation benefits both parties. 
I. DATA PROTECTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Americans and Europeans view personal identity differently, 21  and 
therefore, they understand individuals’ rights over the handling of their personal data 
differently too. Attorneys in the United States and the E.U. do not even use the same 
words to describe the law that governs the handling of personal information. 
Americans include it under the broad rubric of “privacy law,” but E.U. and Irish 
sources consistently refer to it as “data protection law,” a defined subset of a larger 
notion of privacy.22 This difference extends far beyond nomenclature—it reflects 
values. I have used this difference in terminology to provide students and 
practitioners with helpful shorthand for two distinctive models of privacy rules.23 
Europe uses the “data protection” model. In the United States, a “consumer 
protection” model dominates privacy law. 
These distinctions have long and strong roots, extending back to 
antecedents such as continental European social structures based on honor, dignity, 
and rank on one side, and the New World’s individualistic spirit on the other.24 
Ireland can be seen as something of a hybrid: it is an island isolated from some 
historical currents and a part of the Anglo-American legal and political culture, but 
it shares Europe’s formal regulatory structure (by virtue of E.U. membership) as 
                                                                                                                
highly punitive fine-oriented structure to one that includes warning letters for first offenses 
and other more graduated responses). 
 21. Indeed, they view many things differently. See generally The American-
Western European Values Gap, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-western-european-values-gap/. 
 22. See CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE AND REGULATION 2–3 (2d ed. 2007). Bennett argues that the “data protection” 
nomenclature is preferable because it is more precise. See BENNETT, supra note 18, at 12–14. 
 23. See generally WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 
165–323 (2016). 
 24. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004). 
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well as much of the continent’s long feudal and clannish history.25 The differing 
rules in the United States and in Ireland reflect these distinct histories. 
The “data protection” model characterizes law in all E.U. member states, 
including Ireland. As discussed below, data protection law begins with an 
assumption that control over personal information is a human right.26 This generally 
leads, in turn, to particular types of rules, including more specific terms and broader 
prerogatives for individuals.27 On the other side of the ocean, generally applicable 
American privacy law embraces a “consumer protection” approach. 28  U.S. 
regulators, such as the FTC or state attorneys general, regulate privacy by policing 
the fairness of particular transactions, much as they do when safeguarding 
individuals against price gouging or false advertising.29 
All E.U. nations have adopted comprehensive data protection legislation 
overseen by specialized data protection authorities (“DPAs”), while U.S. privacy 
law is more piecemeal—many sectoral statutes that concern only certain subject 
areas or particular technologies. Some of these narrower U.S. regulations are 
properly described as data protection regimes, rather than consumer protection 
regimes. These include regulations propagated by the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)30 and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act (“COPPA”). 31  However, these are exceptions to the general pattern in the 
United States; they were adopted only to protect especially sensitive data in defined 
and highly regulated areas. There are a few sectoral laws in the E.U. as well,32 but 
they all adhere to data protection principles. 
This Part explains more fully the differences between the data protection 
and consumer protection models. But first I want to highlight what is probably the 
most significant of these differences: the default rule. A consumer protection regime 
generally allows any collection and processing of personal data, unless it is 
specifically forbidden. Data protection law adopts the opposite default, permitting 
collection and processing only for a statutorily defined justification. In other words: 
in the United States, it is usually allowed unless the law says that it is not, while in 
the E.U. it is not allowed unless the law says that it is.33 
Because of this and other distinctions between data protection and 
consumer protection law, an observer who simply examined this paper record—
                                                                                                                
 25. See generally RICHARD KILLEEN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF IRELAND (2012). 
 26. See infra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
 27. MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 257–58. 
 28. See infra notes 110–16 and accompanying text. 
 29. See MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 165. 
 30. Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.; 42 
U.S.C.; 26 U.S.C.; 18 U.S.C.); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2016). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06; see 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2016). 
 32. See BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 105–06. 
 33. See MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 257. 
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perhaps the proverbial visiting Martian34—might think the United States and the 
E.U. were different planets when it comes to privacy law. Before the rest of the 
Article turns to the analysis of convergence in enforcement, this initial Part reviews 
the divergence in formal rules and underlying motivations. It will first consider data 
protection rules found in Ireland and the E.U., and then the consumer protection 
model that dominates U.S. privacy law. This discussion will also provide 
background information that is important for understanding the discussion of 
responsive regulation in the remainder of the Article. 
A. The European Data Protection Model 
European legal sources tend to view control over personal data as an 
inherent aspect of individual dignity. This concept can be attributed in part to 
continental political and cultural development of the idea that personal reputation 
and honor are central to human flourishing. 35  Other distinctive European legal 
doctrines, such as moral rights in intellectual property law, have similar origins.36 
Some analysts suggest that the memory of twentieth-century totalitarian 
governments—which compiled personal data to facilitate atrocities such as the Nazi 
Holocaust, the Stalinist purges, and political repression in Warsaw Pact countries—
may also explain reverence for data protection in Europe.37 All of these historical 
experiences probably contribute to the E.U.’s treatment of data protection rights 
today. 
Multiple European constitutional documents and treaties name privacy as 
a fundamental human right, explicitly equivalent to other essential rights such as 
freedom of expression or the entitlement to a fair trial.38 This treatment is clearly 
evident in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the closest thing to an E.U. 
                                                                                                                
 34. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[M]odern cell phones 
. . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from 
Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”). 
 35. See Whitman, supra note 24, at 1164–89 (tracing the emergence of privacy 
rights from continental European concepts of honor and dignity); see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) 
A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. XII (Dec. 10, 1948) (“No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
attacks upon his honour and reputation.”). 
 36. See generally Sonya G. Bonneau, Honor and Destruction: The Conflicted 
Object in Moral Rights Law, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 47, 53–54 (2013). 
 37. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy in Europe: Initial 
Data on Governance Choices and Corporate Practices, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1529, 1618 
(2013); Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in 
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1349–50 (2000). 
 38. See, e.g., Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 
8(1), Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.”); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 35 (“No 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.”). 
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constitutional bill of rights,39 as well as the European Convention on Human Rights, 
of which Ireland is a signatory (as are all other E.U. nations).40 These documents 
enshrine positive rights based on dignity and honor that are generally enforceable 
against non-state actors. For example, individuals can invoke privacy rights 
guaranteed by the European Convention or the E.U. Charter in support of lawsuits 
against newspapers or magazines that allegedly invaded their privacy.41 
The Irish Constitution (like its U.S. counterpart) does not recognize an 
explicit right to privacy or data protection in so many words, but Irish courts (like 
U.S. ones) have inferred general privacy rights from other constitutional text and 
structure. 42  Substantively, however, the resulting inferences from Ireland’s 
constitutional order resemble the privacy rights enshrined more directly in other 
European constitutions, rather than American constitutional privacy. As 
summarized by a pair of Trinity College legal scholars, “[t]he Irish courts have 
consistently described the right to privacy in a way which emphasises its connection 
with dignitary values.”43 Regardless of the interpretation of the Republic of Ireland’s 
constitution, the country is also subject to the provisions of the European Convention 
and, when implementing E.U. law, the Charter. Thus, European and Irish 
                                                                                                                
 39. Article 8 of the Charter reads: 
Protection of personal data 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning 
him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate 
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which 
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority. 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C326) 391, 397. 
 40. European Convention on Human Rights supra note 38. Adherence to the 
Convention is entirely separate from E.U. membership. Plenty of countries that do not belong 
to the E.U. are signatories of the Convention; the United Kingdom’s planned withdrawal from 
the E.U. would not itself change its status as a Convention signatory. Katie Grant, What Does 
Brexit Mean For Our Human Rights?, INEWS (June 24, 2016, 5:37 PM), 
https://inews.co.uk/essentials/news/uk/brexit-means-human-rights/. 
 41. See, e.g., Mosley v. News Grp. Newspapers Ltd., [2008] EWHC (Q.B.) 1777 
(Eng.); Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 294; Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany (No. 2), EUR. CT. HUMAN RTS. (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145700. 
 42. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Mahon [2006] IEHC 86 (H. Ct.) (Ir.); Kennedy v. Ireland 
[1987] IR 587 (Ir.); Norris v. Attorney General, [1984] I.R. 36 (SC) (Ir.). 
 43. HILARY DELANY & EOIN CAROLAN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 37 (2008) (“Irish 
constitutional law rejected the traditional Anglo-American conception of privacy as a narrow 
interest in isolation or inaccessibility in favour of a more sophisticated understanding of 
privacy as a relational right.”). The authors’ discussion tracing the historical development of 
Irish constitutional privacy jurisprudence can be found at id. at 33–56. 
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constitutional law combine to establish control over personal data as a human right 
of the highest order. 
Statutory enactments in Europe and Ireland protect these rights with a 
robust data protection regime. For the last several decades, the central statutory 
instrument in the E.U. has been the Data Protection Directive of 1995 (“the 
Directive”),44 which was promulgated just as the commercial development of the 
internet was set to explode with the spread of web browsers.45 The Directive sought 
to harmonize data protection law throughout the E.U., consistent with the Union’s 
broader goal of removing obstacles to free trade and movement between member 
states.46 While it aimed for uniformity, the Directive also set a relatively stringent 
baseline for substantive data protection around which countries would coalesce.47 
Article 1 of the Directive sets out these twin goals directly.48 
Like all E.U. directives, the Data Protection Directive compelled member 
states to enact domestic legislation consistent with its terms. It left some margin for 
different implementations on certain points, including many enforcement decisions, 
but it also set minimum requirements for national law. 49  In 1988, before the 
Directive, Ireland had already enacted a comprehensive Data Protection Act.50 In 
2003, the Irish Parliament amended the 1988 Act to reconcile a few remaining 
inconsistencies between the statute and the Directive.51 
                                                                                                                
 44. See Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council on 24 
Oct. 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 OJ (L281) 31 [hereinafter E.U. Data Protection 
Directive]. 
 45. The first web browser, Mosaic, was released in 1993. The year of the 
Directive, 1995, was also when Microsoft introduced its groundbreaking Internet Explorer 
browser, and the year both Amazon and eBay were founded. See Fifteen Years of the Web, 
BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5243862.stm. 
 46. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union pmbl., Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47. 
 47. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1973–74 (describing how Member States passed 
omnibus legislation to satisfy the Directive’s requirements). 
 48. As the Directive says: 
1. In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their 
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. 
2. Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of 
personal data between Member States for reasons connected with the 
protection afforded under paragraph 1. 
E.U. Data Protection Directive, supra note 44, at art. 1. 
 49. See KUNER, supra note 22, at 34–35 (describing the supremacy of E.U. law 
and implementation of directives). 
 50. Data Protection Act, (Act No. 25/1988) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1988/en/act/pub/0025/index.html [hereinafter Irish Data 
Protection Act 1988]. 
 51. Data Protection Act 2003 (Act No.6/2003) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/en/act/pub/0006/index.html [hereinafter Irish Data 
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When it takes effect in 2018, the GDPR will automatically become the law 
in Ireland and every other E.U. nation, supplanting the Directive and previous 
national data protection laws.52 Because the GDPR is even stricter than the Directive 
and the Irish Act in every important respect, the upcoming change does not affect 
the analysis of responsive regulation in this Article, which only describes the formal 
data protection regime in broad strokes. Indeed, the GDPR leaves national data 
protection authorities in place as its primary enforcers even while making 
substantive law more restrictive. As a result, the new rules might increase the 
distance between the enactments written in the books by European functionaries and 
the actions of regulators acting on the ground in individual member-state capitals.53 
Ireland’s Data Protection Act is very faithful to the Directive, and the core 
provisions described here are close to the GDPR as well. Its central definitions are 
the broad categories of “personal data” and “processing.”54 According to the Act, 
personal data is “data relating to a living individual who is or can be identified.”55 
As guidance from the ODPC explains, “The definition is—deliberately — a very 
broad one. In principle, it covers any information that relates to an identifiable, 
living individual.” 56  This is exactly how the Directive defines personal data. 57 
“Personally identifiable information” is a well-recognized category in privacy law; 
similar definitions are found in several U.S. data protection statutes, including the 
HIPAA regulations.58 
                                                                                                                
Protection Act]. The Law Reform Commission has prepared an unofficial administrative 
consolidation of the 1988 and 2003 Acts. Law Reform Commission, Data Protection Act 
1988 Revised (July 30 2016), 
www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/RevisedActs/WithAnnotations/EN_ACT_1988_0025.PDF. 
 52. See European Commission Press Release MEMO/15/6385, Questions and 
Answers—Data Protection Reform (Dec. 21, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-15-6385_en.htm; European Commission Press Release IP/15/6321, 
Agreement on Commission’s EU Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single Market 
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm. 
 53. That said, the GDPR also includes mechanisms to increase uniformity of 
regulatory choices in different member states. For more about the distribution of regulatory 
authority under the GDPR, see infra notes 400–01 and accompanying text. 
 54. Irish Data Protection Act supra note 51, § 1(a)(iv)–(v). 
 55. Id. 
 56. What is Personal Data? DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER, 
http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/What-is-Personal-Data-/210.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 
2016). See generally PETER CAREY, DATA PROTECTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO IRISH AND EU 
LAW 12–17 (2010). 
 57. E.U. Data Protection Directive, supra note 44, at art. 2. (“‘[P]ersonal data’ 
shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data 
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity[.]”). 
 58. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (defining “individually identifiable health 
information”). Some scholars have warned that the concept of “personally identifiable 
information” should be substantially revised. See generally Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of 
Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 
1704 (2010) (warning that increased access to data and greater computing power can facilitate 
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The Data Protection Act’s definition of processing is, if anything, even 
more wide-ranging.59 Almost all modern digital activities fall under its umbrella, 
including virtually any imaginable collection, use, manipulation, distribution, or 
storage of personal data.60 Manual methods such as keeping documents in a filing 
cabinet are also covered, provided they hold personal data in a “relevant filing 
system.”61 The Act also defines various actors connected to personal data: a data 
subject is “an individual who is the subject of personal data”; a data controller 
“controls the contents and use of personal data”; and a data processor—in practice, 
often a data controller’s subcontractor—“processes personal data on behalf of a data 
controller.”62 These roles span all industries and all types of personal information, 
and they include private individuals as well as government, commercial, and 
nonprofit organizations.63 
With all these terms defined, the Data Protection Act next addresses the 
substantive obligations of data controllers and processors. In line with the default 
rule of a data protection model, the Act only allows processing of personal data on 
                                                                                                                
the combination of disparate data points to identify seemingly anonymous users); Paul M. 
Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally 
Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814 (2011) (arguing that privacy law needs a 
personally identifiable information component but it should be reworked). Nevertheless, it 
remains a core concept in much of privacy and data protection law, including not only the 
Directive but also the future GDPR. See European Commission Press Release 
MEMO/15/6385, Questions and Answers—Data Protection Reform, supra note 52. 
 59. The full definition reads: 
“[P]rocessing” of or in relation to information or data, means performing 
any operation or set of operations on the information or data, whether or 
not by automatic means, including— 
(a) obtaining, recording or keeping the information or data, 
(b) collecting, organising, storing, altering or adapting the 
information or data, 
(c) retrieving, consulting or using the information or data, 
(d) disclosing the information or data by transmitting, disseminating 
or otherwise making it available, or 
(e) aligning, combining, blocking, erasing or destroying the 
information or data[.] 
Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 1(a)(v). 
 60. See CAREY, supra note 56, at 18–19 (“This definition of processing is very 
wide and it is probably without limit. It could include anything that could be done with data.”). 
 61. Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 1(a)(i) (defining “manual data”); 
CAREY, supra note 56, at 10–11 (describing examples of “manual data” subject to the Data 
Protection Act). 
 62. Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 1. 
 63. CAREY, supra note 56, at 17 (expanding on scope of covered “persons” in 
statute). 
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the basis of “legitimate processing conditions”64 specifically listed in the statute.65 
These include affirmative consent of the data subject,66 legitimate interests of the 
data processor,67 and various public functions (most of which concern public sector 
data processing).68 Regulators and courts in both the E.U. and Ireland generally 
construe these narrowly. 69  The Data Protection Act also defines a category of 
“sensitive personal data,” 70  which is subject to an additional list of conditions 
beyond those applicable to all other personal data.71 
Data subjects enjoy rights of access to records about themselves, whether 
held by public or private entities.72 They have a right to be informed whether a data 
collector holds their personal information, and to inspect that data.73 In Ireland, data 
subjects may demand copies of their personal data for a maximum charge of €6.35.74 
The Directive also grants data subjects the right to request that an entity correct or 
                                                                                                                
 64. PAUL LAMBERT, DATA PROTECTION LAW IN IRELAND: SOURCES AND ISSUES 69 
(2013). 
 65. Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 4(2A). 
 66. Id. § 4 (2A)(1)(a). This provision also allows for family members to give 
consent on behalf of minors or incapacitated persons. Id. The GDPR continues the recognition 
of the data subject’s consent as a legitimizing condition, but imposes a stricter standard for 
how that consent can be secured. See GDPR, supra note 13, at art. 7. 
 67. Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 4(2A)(1)(d). The statute explicitly 
subordinates interests of the data processor to those of the data subject, so this legitimizing 
condition does not apply in cases where there is “prejudice to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject.” Id. 
 68.  Id. §4( 2A)(1)(c). These are enumerated in broad terms including “the 
administration of justice” and “function[s] of a public nature.” Id. 
 69. See, e.g., Case C-212/13, Ryneš v. Úřad Pro Ochranu Osobních Údajů, 2014 
EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62013CJ0212 ¶¶ 29–30 (Dec. 11, 2014) (“Since the provisions of 
Directive 95/46, in so far as they govern the processing of personal data liable to infringe 
fundamental freedoms, in particular the right to privacy, must necessarily be interpreted in 
the light of the fundamental rights set out in the Charter, the exception provided for in the 
second indent of Article 3(2) of that directive must be narrowly construed.”) (citation 
omitted); CAREY, supra note 56, at 39–46 (particularly ¶¶ 4-22, 4-34, 4-39, 4-44, and 4-47). 
 70. Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 1(a)(1) (including within the 
definition of “sensitive personal data” the following: racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, physical or mental health, sexual 
life, commission or alleged commission of any offense, and any related criminal proceedings 
including verdict or sentencing). 
 71. Id. § 4(2B)(1)(b); see CAREY, supra note 56, at 58 (distilling these into 13 
distinct conditions). 
 72. For a summary, see LAMBERT, supra note 64, at 87–108. 
 73. See BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 98 (dividing access rights into four 
categories, including right to know that data is held and to review it, as well as rights to 
“correct or delete” and associated rights of redress). 
 74. Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 5; see Data Protection (Fees) 
Regulation (S.I. No. 347/1988) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1988/si/347/made/en/print; Accessing Your Personal 
Information, DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER, 
https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Making-an-Access-Request/963.htm (last visited Oct. 
29, 2016). 
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delete inaccurate or irrelevant personal information and to revoke previous consent 
for data processing.75 In 2014, the E.U.’s highest court interpreted the Directive to 
stipulate that these prerogatives, in combination, allow data subjects to demand the 
removal of certain search engine links about themselves.76 As of November 2016, 
Google had fielded 4,485 such requests from people in Ireland.77 
The comprehensive Irish Data Protection Act, as is typical in the E.U., 
extends to all types of organizations, be they public or private, for-profit or non-
profit. The single statute covers every industry and every type of data.78 Special 
additional requirements apply to sensitive data, but these are integrated into the same 
underlying statute, not treated separately.79 The Irish law also covers most types of 
data-handling activities; it uses expansive definitions of personal data, of the 
individuals protected by the law, and of its territorial scope. 80 While E.U. data 
protection regimes do contain exceptions, especially for governmental activities, 
their scope is still much broader than that of any privacy law in the United States.81 
B. The American Consumer Protection Model 
U.S. privacy law is a smorgasbord. In contrast to European omnibus data 
protection statutes, most American privacy legislation responds to narrowly defined 
problems and applies solely to the type of data connected with that problem.82 Some 
statutes take aim at particular industries, such as providers of healthcare or cable 
television.83 Others relate only to certain types of technology, such as the federal 
Wiretap Act 84  or state laws specifically forbidding spyware 85  or “upskirt” 
                                                                                                                
 75. E.U. Data Protection Directive, supra note 44, at art. 12. 
 76. Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014). 
 77. See European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE: 
TRANSPARENCY REP., https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/ 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (select Ireland from drop-down menu). 
 78. LAMBERT, supra note 65, at 57 (“All organizations that collect and process 
personal data must comply with the obligations of the Irish data protection regime.”); see E.U. 
Data Protection Directive, supra note 44, at art. 3 (defining broad scope for E.U. data 
protection law). 
 79. Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 4(2B). 
 80. Id. § 1. 
 81. See ORLA LYNSKEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW 15–30 
(2015). 
 82. See Francesca Bignami & Giorgio Resta, Transatlantic Privacy Regulation: 
Conflict and Cooperation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 238 (2015); Paul M. Schwartz, 
Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 908–10 (2009). 
 83. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.; 42 U.S.C.; 26 U.S.C.; 18 U.S.C.); 
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) 
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 84. Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral 
Communication Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). 
 85. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947–22947.6 (West 2016) 
(preventing unauthorized users from collecting and using information on another’s computer 
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photography.86 Some information, such as personal financial records, may fall under 
multiple regimes simultaneously. 87  State tort law adds further mandates. 88 
Government behavior is controlled largely by distinct constitutional limitations, 
combined with a few specialized statutes that add requirements above those 
constitutional minimums.89 Many of these rules are enforced by the judiciary rather 
than any administrative enforcement authority.90 
A few of these sectoral statutes in the United States resemble E.U. data 
protection laws.91 They turn on the nature of the underlying personal information 
and individuals’ interests in it, rather than on the transaction between data subjects 
and organizations. Like their European counterparts, they typically permit only data 
processing that falls within a legitimizing condition, and some also grant rights of 
access.92 
The scope of these American data protection laws is limited, however. 
Health privacy rules promulgated under HIPAA cover a defined category of 
individually identifiable “personal health information” and only bind “covered 
entities” (mostly health insurers and medical providers) and their subcontractors.93 
                                                                                                                
in a variety of ways without consent); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/17-52.5 (West 2011) 
(outlawing a variety of activities classified as “computer fraud”); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-40-
301 to 13-40-303 (West 2016) (preventing unauthorized users from collecting and using 
information on another’s computer in a variety of ways without consent). 
 86. See, e.g., MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 105 (West 2014) (banning 
surreptitious nonconsensual photography of private areas of the body, in response to the use 
of hidden cameras to photograph under women’s skirts in public places). 
 87. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012); Graham-
Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012); Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311–
5332 (2012). 
 88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 28, §§ 652A–652E (AM. LAW INST. 
1977). Common-law tort claims, while often pleaded, seldom address the issues connected 
with large-scale modern data processing. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy 
Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1805, 1826–28 (2010); see also Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, 
Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1922–24 (2010). 
 89. See Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2712, 3121–3127 (2012). 
 90. That is true, naturally, of the common-law torts. It also describes almost all 
enforcement against privacy violations by government actors, whether constitutional or 
statutory. Because this Article concerns regulatory agencies’ enforcement models, tort claims 
and restrictions against government activity fall outside its scope. But the existence of 
additional privacy rules beyond administrative regulations further demonstrates the 
fragmented nature of U.S. privacy law. 
 91. See MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 322–23 (listing and briefly describing 
several U.S. sectoral data protection statutes). 
 92. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (listing permissible 
purposes of consumer report information); § 1681g (mandating disclosure of certain 
consumer records to consumers upon request). 
 93. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102 (2016); Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, 
Security, Enforcement and Breach Notification Rules; Other Modifications to the HIPAA 
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5589 (Jan. 25, 2013). 
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Protection for children’s privacy under COPPA94 applies only to operators of online 
services like websites, and only when they have actual or constructive knowledge 
that they gather information from children under the age of 13.95 The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act only regulates certain carefully defined dossiers of information that 
are intended for specified purposes, such as underwriting loans or insurance and 
screening employment applicants.96 These specialized statutes leave undisturbed the 
U.S. default rule—data collection and processing is allowed unless a specific rule 
forbids it—because most activities are not subject to these narrow restrictions. 
Constitutional privacy rights in the United States are also circumscribed. 
The U.S. Constitution is the oldest national written constitution in use today and is 
among the most difficult to amend.97 Consequently, it says little about the modern 
concept of privacy and does not mention the word “privacy” at all. Generally, 
constitutional recognition of privacy in the United States is consistent with a more 
libertarian and less constitutive view of those rights. It is a highly American form of 
privacy, intended to keep the government out of citizens’ lives. This familiar “right 
to be let alone”98 was, according to Justice Brandeis, “the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”99 
Yet protection for this most comprehensive of rights in the U.S. 
Constitution100 is not nearly as comprehensive as data protection rights in European 
constitutions. Privacy is generally subordinate to many other rights expressed more 
clearly in the constitutional text, most notably the First Amendment guarantee of 
free speech.101Furthermore, U.S. constitutional privacy protects individuals from 
                                                                                                                
 94. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6502 (2012); 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.2, 312.3 (2016). 
 95. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 312.2, 312.3 (2016). 
 96. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 
 97. See Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of 
Constitutional Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 260–61 (1996). 
 98. For early uses of the phrase, see THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS, OR, THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29 (2d ed. 1888); Samuel 
D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
 99. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 100. A number of U.S. state constitutions enumerate a more specific privacy right 
than does the federal constitution. Only one of them, California, confers anything like a data 
protection right, or any right against private actors. See CAL. CONST., art. 1, §1; Hill v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994). However, the test for suits under 
this California constitutional provision is rigorous: “The party claiming a violation of the 
constitutional right of privacy established in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution 
must establish (1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy 
under the circumstances, and (3) a serious invasion of the privacy interest.” International 
Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers, Local 21 v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 488, 
499 (Cal. 2007). 
 101. The boundaries between these two are highly contested in the scholarly 
literature. Compare, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The 
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1049 (2000) (arguing that most privacy laws present possible conflicts with the First 
Amendment), with NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
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snooping or meddling by the government, but it does not constrain a person (or 
private business) from collecting or using information about others, nor does it 
confer human rights on individuals to control their personal data.102 It is, to borrow 
from Isaiah Berlin, a negative liberty rather than a positive one.103 
Of course, modern courts have read various privacy protections into their 
constitutional interpretations. The Fourth Amendment protects privacy not only 
from law enforcement searches 104  but against unreasonable intrusions in public 
schools105 and government workplaces106 as well. A line of cases under the doctrine 
of substantive due process protects “decisional privacy” in intimately personal 
matters.107 Even the First Amendment generates privacy rights necessary to exercise 
the fundamental freedoms protected there.108 
This constitutional jurisprudence does not confer any broad right to control 
personal information equivalent to European human rights to data protection. U.S. 
constitutional rights protect individuals from government interference—for 
example, from unreasonable searches 109  or limits on autonomous personal 
choices.110 The Supreme Court had explicit opportunities to identify a substantive 
constitutional right to data protection three times, but each time it declined to do 
so.111 In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court accepted only that a duty to safeguard 
citizen data in government databases “arguably has its roots in the Constitution,”112 
and lower courts have been divided and inconsistent in their recognition of even the 
narrowest version of this right.113 
                                                                                                                
THE DIGITAL AGE 86–90 (2014) (arguing that most privacy laws are consistent with the First 
Amendment). 
 102. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 
(1989) (holding that constitutional rights limit state action, but do not compel the government 
to restrain private actors from conduct). See generally Richard S. Kay, The State Action 
Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 
CONST. COMMENT. 329 (1993) (summarizing and commenting upon scholarly and judicial 
debate about the boundaries of the state action doctrine in the late twentieth century). 
 103. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON 
LIBERTY 118, 127 (1969). 
 104. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
 105. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 325 (1985). 
 106. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 709 (1987). 
 107. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 108. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995); Stanley 
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969); see also RICHARDS, supra note 101; Daniel J. Solove, 
The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (2007). 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). 
 110. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S at 485 (1965). 
 111. See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2010); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. 
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977). 
 112. 429 U.S. at 605 (emphasis added). 
 113. For a sense of the wide range, see, e.g., Cooksey v. Boyer, 289 F.3d 513, 516 
(8th Cir. 2002) (suggesting disclosures “must be either a shocking degradation or an egregious 
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So, sectoral statutes and torts cover narrowly defined behavior, and some 
additional constitutional proscriptions apply to government activity. But most 
private data-handling activities in the United States fall outside all these laws—
generally including data mining by companies like Amazon or Google, files kept by 
local real estate brokers or bookstores, targeted advertising, most employee records, 
location tracking, shopper loyalty programs, and many more examples. Importantly 
for this Article, the massive data processing of Facebook (and other social media 
platforms) generally falls outside these rules too. Are the potential privacy issues 
raised by all these examples simply unregulated? 
Well, no. In the absence of general-purpose omnibus privacy law like the 
E.U. Directive, consumer protection regulators such as the FTC and state attorneys 
general have moved in to fill the resulting vacuum.114 This is the dominant consumer 
protection approach to privacy law in the United States. 
Consumer protection law is tied to the inequitable nature of the underlying 
transaction, not to individual rights over personal data. The FTC imposes the most 
widely applicable privacy obligations on commercial entities in the United States. It 
does so by using its authority under Section 5 of its founding statute to police “unfair 
and deceptive acts or practices” in interstate commerce.115 Attorneys general in 
individual states have also emerged as important enforcers of privacy law, using 
power granted under state consumer protection statutes that resemble the FTC’s 
Section 5 authority.116 
Consumer protection regulators like the FTC thus play a cleanup role in the 
system, regulating privacy where sectoral statutes do not. But even the FTC’s 
Section 5 authority is limited not only by the substance of consumer protection, but 
also by activity that is nongovernmental, interstate, and commercial—and portions 
of specified industries are exempt from much FTC regulation, including some 
financial institutions, telecommunications carriers, and airlines.117 
                                                                                                                
humiliation” to violate the constitutional right to privacy) (citing Alexander v. Peffer, 993 
F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993)); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO v. Dep't of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (expressing “grave doubts as to the existence 
of a constitutional right of privacy in the nondisclosure of personal information”); J.P. v. 
DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1088 (6th Cir. 1981) (criticizing “courts [that] have uncritically 
picked up that part of Whalen pertaining to nondisclosure and have created a rule that the 
courts must balance a governmental intrusion on this ‘right’ of privacy against the 
government’s interest in the intrusion”); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 
570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (recognizing the right and articulating a multifactor test to apply it). 
 114. See Citron, supra note 15, at 3–4 (discussing the role of state attorneys 
general); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15, at 585–86 (discussing the role of the FTC). 
 115. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). For informative accounts of the FTC’s 
enforcement of privacy law through application of Section 5, see generally HOOFNAGLE, 
supra note 15; Solove & Hartzog, supra note 15. 
 116. See Citron, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 117. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006) (listing exceptions from FTC authority); FTC 
v. AT&T Mobility, No. 15-16585, 2016 WL 4501685, at *3–5 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016) 
(interpreting “common carrier” exception from FTC authority extremely broadly in a case 
outside of privacy law but applicable to all matters covered by Section 5, including privacy). 
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Where it applies, the FTC’s Section 5 power is broad. As one court found 
in upholding the FTC’s authority over privacy violations, unfair practices need not 
be otherwise unlawful, provided they meet the test for unfairness in the statute.118 
That test finds a practice unfair if it “[1] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury 
to consumers [2] which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and 
[3] [is] not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.” 119  In addition, Section 5 prohibits deceptive practices related to 
privacy—essentially any deviation in a company’s actions from the material 
representations it has made about its data-handling practices. These “broken 
promises” could be found not only in a formal privacy policy, but also in, for 
example, marketing materials, help or support information such as FAQ’s, or even 
the implications a reasonable person would draw from the interface on a website.120 
The FTC has gradually developed working definitions of unfairness and 
deception by using responsive regulation techniques.121 These evolving standards 
contrast with the detailed rules marking the boundaries of data protection law in 
Ireland. In its most basic form, the consumer protection model has long relied on 
concepts of “notice and choice” or “privacy control,” requiring transparency about 
data-handling practices and giving individuals the ability to “opt out” by declining 
to proceed with a transaction. 122  This procedural focus—forcing disclosure and 
relying on market forces to embody consumers’ privacy preferences—differs from 
the substantive requirements of a data protection model. It does not provide 
individuals with the broad rights of access or correction they have under the data 
protection model.123 There is very little right to be forgotten under U.S. law either.124 
                                                                                                                
 118. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that Section 5 “enables the FTC to take action against unfair practices that have not yet been 
contemplated by more specific laws”). 
 119. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); see FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 244 
(3d Cir. 2015) (tracing history of unfairness test). 
 120. See In re Snapchat, Inc., No. C-4501, 2014 WL 7495798, at *3–7 (Dec. 23, 
2014) (charging a company with all these types of misrepresentations); see also Solove & 
Hartzog, supra note 15, at 628–33 (describing evolution of FTC interpretation of deceptive 
practices in the privacy context). 
 121. See infra Section III.B. 
 122. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans’ Privacy in Electronic 
Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 779 (1999); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy 
and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 816 (2000). 
 123. A few extremely limited rights to examine personal data can be found in 
isolated parts of federal and state privacy law in the United States but nothing approaches 
Ireland’s general right of access to personal data held by the private sector. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681g (2012) (providing consumers access to their own credit reports); 16 C.F.R. § 312.6 
(2016) (providing right for parents to examine data collected from children under age 13 
within scope of the statute); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (West 2006) (providing right to be 
informed about disclosures of personal data to third parties). 
 124. In certain circumstances, California’s new “Eraser Law” allows juveniles to 
withdraw information that they themselves have posted online. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§ 22581 (West 2015). U.S. regulation of credit reports also prohibits the inclusion of certain 
personal data such as bankruptcies and tax liens after specified time periods. See 15 U.S.C. 
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In addition, unlike European and Irish laws, which provide legal redress to 
any affected individual—consistent with their understanding of data protection as a 
core human right—many U.S. statutes reserve enforcement power for administrative 
regulators alone. Only the FTC can enforce Section 5,125 and individuals cannot 
bring private lawsuits under numerous sectoral data protection laws. 126  Some 
statutes do allow individual suits,127 but even those opportunities are subject to 
considerable practical limitations, such as the need to prove particularized injury 
that confers standing to sue.128 If this hurdle is passed, damages for individual claims 
may be small, which often means that class actions are the only viable mechanism 
for private action. Regulatory agencies have procedures for individuals to file 
complaints,129 but unlike the ODPC and other E.U. data protection authorities, there 
is no obligation for U.S. agencies to act on these consumer grievances. 
This Part’s summary of the difference between Irish data protection law 
and U.S. consumer protection regulation “on the books” helps explain why 
conventional wisdom assumes European regulation is always much more 
demanding and protective of privacy than its American counterpart. The Article now 
turns to the use of responsive regulation techniques “on the ground” to show how 
enforcement choices can de-emphasize those distinctions and effectively promote 
privacy under either legal model. 
II. RESPONSIVE REGULATION 
A generation of administrative law scholars has debated numerous forms 
of “new governance”—many of them no longer all that new—that move beyond 
traditional command-and-control policymaking and enforcement to improve the 
                                                                                                                
§ 1681c(a) (2012). But these are very narrow rights compared to those provided by the Google 
Spain case. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014). 
 125. See Sovern, supra note 18, at 1321–22, 1321 n.63. 
 126. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 274 (2002) (finding no private 
right of action under statute protecting privacy of student records); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 
569, 572 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding there is no private cause of action under HIPAA). 
 127. See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (2012); 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2012); Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §2520 (2002). State consumer protection laws often 
permit individual suits. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-
204 (West 2016). 
 128. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (requiring 
allegation of a privacy-related injury under FCRA to be both concrete and particularized in 
order to confer standing); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013) 
(finding allegations of electronic surveillance by intelligence agencies “too speculative to 
satisfy the well-established requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”) 
(internal quotation omitted); In re iPhone Application Litig., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1012–15 
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding lack of standing under California consumer protection statute). 
 129. See How to File a Complaint with the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE 
COMMISSION (Jan. 19, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/video/how-file-
complaint-federal-trade-commission; Filing a HIPAA Complaint, U.S DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/filing-a-complaint/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). 
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effectiveness and legitimacy of regulation. These scholars also have sought to 
identify the ideal mixture of adversarial and cooperative approaches to maximize 
compliance with the law. In their landmark 1992 book, Ian Ayres and John 
Braithwaite captured the debate: “The crucial question has become: When to punish; 
when to persuade?”130 While policymakers and legal scholars have increasingly 
embraced a wide range of creative and flexible approaches to traditional regulatory 
tasks in the intervening quarter century,131 that question remains the crucial one 
today. 
A. Coregulation: Theory and Reality 
In privacy law, scholars and legislators most often have gravitated toward 
a particular flavor of new governance, sometimes called “coregulation,” where 
agencies collaborate with industry groups or other third parties to develop detailed 
substantive rules. 132  These rules may then become enforceable law, frequently 
(though not always) subject to some approval or ratification by government 
regulators.133 Coregulation and self-regulation can be partial or comprehensive and 
can entail various levels of government participation. 134  Whatever its structure, 
proponents of coregulation hope that active engagement with industry partners will 
make the resulting requirements more feasible and more widely accepted by 
regulated parties. 
Several scholars have studied the possibility of privacy coregulation 
closely. In a series of articles, Dennis Hirsch has drawn on experiences of 
coregulation in environmental legislation135 and in the data protection law of the 
                                                                                                                
 130. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 21 (1992). 
 131. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004) 
(comprehensively reviewing “a paradigm shift from a regulatory to a governance model, 
signifying a collective intellectual and programmatic project for a new legal regime”). 
 132. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 106; Jody Freeman, 
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1997) (using 
the term collaborative governance, instead of coregulation); Neil Gunningham & Joseph 
Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19 L. & POL’Y 363, 366 (1997); 
cf. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-
REGULATION (2010) (applying related new governance concepts to labor and employment 
law). 
 133. See Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond 
Voluntary Codes, 6 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 355, 383 (2011) (describing government 
approval as necessary to ensure baseline regulatory objectives are met); see also BENNETT & 
RAAB, supra note 18, at 123–33 (describing different industry-generated self-regulatory 
instruments). 
 134. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 50–55 (1998). 
 135. See generally Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What 
Privacy Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1 (2006); Hirsch, 
supra note 15. 
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Netherlands136 as possible models for data privacy rulemaking. Ira Rubinstein has 
developed a normative framework that identifies “six elements that are critical to 
the success of co-regulatory initiatives” in privacy law.137 
Thus far, however, privacy coregulation in Ireland and in the United States 
has existed much more often as an idea than as reality. In theory, Ireland’s Data 
Protection Act envisions reliance on industry-created codes of practice.138 In reality, 
there are few examples. There is a code concerning data breach notification, but the 
ODPC treats it as a statement of best practices and not as a source of authoritative 
legal obligations or defenses.139 Otherwise almost all codes of practice approved by 
ODPC focus on public-sector entities. 140  The GDPR contains similar rules for 
coregulation through codes of conduct and certification marks, but it is unclear 
whether implementation of this approach will be any more common in Ireland than 
it is today.141 
There is even less demonstrated adoption of coregulation in U.S. privacy 
law. In one instance, HIPAA mandated that data security regulations governing 
healthcare providers and insurers must be developed with significant input from 
industry players through a preexisting advisory board.142 David Thaw examined this 
process and found several fairly unusual attributes that, he argues, made it a 
coregulation success story.143 Otherwise, coregulation has been a cornerstone of 
proposed legislation in the United States, including the Obama Administration’s 
                                                                                                                
 136. See generally Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy 
Regulation and the Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83 (2014). 
 137. Rubinstein, supra note 133, at 380. The elements are: “efficiency, openness 
and transparency, completeness, strategies to address free rider problems, oversight and 
enforcement, and use of second-generation design features.” Id. 
 138. Irish Data Protection Act, supra note 51, § 14(a)(2). 
(instructing Commissioner to “encourage trade associations and other bodies representing 
categories of data controllers to prepare codes of practice to be complied with by those 
categories in dealing with personal data”). 
 139. See CAREY, supra note 56, at 71. 
 140. See id. at 161; DATA PROTECTION COMM’R, Annual Report of the Data 
Protection Commissioner of Ireland 2014, at 11, 
https://www.dataprotection.ie/docimages/documents/Annual%20Report%202014.pdf. 
[hereinafter 2014 Annual Report]. For an example, see PERS. INJURY ASSESSMENT BD., Data 
Protection Code of Practice (Jan. 9, 2008), 
http://www.injuriesboard.ie/eng/resources/Data_Protection_Code_of_Practice/Data_Protect
ion_Code_of_Practice.pdf. 
 141. GDPR, supra note 13, at arts. 40–43. 
 142. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1–d-2(2012). 
 143. See David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 
353–62 (2014). Thaw identifies the historical roots of the advisory committee involved (an 
elite body of top professionals that has existed since the 1950s), the collective good of 
cybersecurity in a closed industry, and the ability of the federal Department of Health and 
Human Services to write its own rules if these experts could not agree. Id. at 364–67. These 
features would be difficult to recreate in a more contentious and open-ended issue area (like 
most privacy issues) and without a preexisting elite advisory board. 
982 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:959 
marquee privacy initiative144 and numerous bills sponsored by members of Congress 
from both parties.145 None of these became law. 
Coregulation may be a promising mechanism for the future development 
of privacy law, but there are significant limitations that would make it difficult to 
apply broadly in a system like that in the United States or Ireland. First, where it 
exists, coregulation often depends on unique historical features. For example, as 
Hirsch explained in his comprehensive study, Dutch privacy coregulation depends 
on the longstanding and widespread tradition of cooperative regulation in the 
Netherlands known as the “polder model,” named for areas of land below sea level 
that were reclaimed through massive cooperative effort on the country’s famed dikes 
and pumps.146 Second, most proposals for coregulation—including those introduced 
in Washington, D.C.—contemplate an elaborate multilateral consultation process 
seeking broad consensus about privacy law. 147  While stakeholder involvement 
would confer more legitimacy on coregulation efforts, it would also make true 
consensus much more difficult and expensive to accomplish.148 For example, the 
effort to develop a “do not track” protocol for websites 149  foundered because 
industry representatives and privacy advocates could never reach consensus on 
fundamental issues after years of acrimonious effort, and the initiative’s final 
product was extremely limited.150 
                                                                                                                
 144. See Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015 17–20 (Discussion Draft), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-
discussion-draft.pdf (proposing safe harbors from liability for data processing conducted in 
compliance with industry-developed codes of conduct). 
 145. See Best Practices Act, H.R. 611, 112th Cong. § 401 (2011); Consumer 
Privacy Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 1528, 112th Cong. § 9 (2011); Commercial Privacy Bill 
of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. § 501 (2011). 
 146. See Hirsch, supra note 136, at 123–25. There is a vast academic and 
journalistic literature on the polder model. See, e.g., LEI DELSEN, EXIT POLDER MODEL?: 
SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE NETHERLANDS (2002); Yda Schreuder, The Polder Model 
in Dutch Economic and Environmental Planning, 21 BULL. SCI. TECH. SOC. 237 (August 
2001); Same Old Dutch: Is the Polder Model Back?, ECONOMIST (Nov. 3, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21565661-polder-model-back-same-old-dutch. 
 147. For a powerful normative argument about the importance of such broad 
participation, see Freeman, supra note 132, at 77–82; see also Rubinstein, supra note 133, at 
421. 
 148. See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as 
the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 450 (2000). 
 149. Tracking Protection Working Group, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, 
http://www.w3.org/2011/tracking-protection/ (last visited July 8, 2014). 
 150. See Dawn Chmielewski, How ‘Do Not Track’ Ended Up Going Nowhere, 
RE/CODE (Jan. 4, 2016), http://recode.net/2016/01/04/how-do-not-track-ended-up-going-
nowhere; Kate Kaye, Do Not Track Is Finally Coming, But Not as Originally Planned, 
ADVERTISING AGE (July 17, 2015), http://adage.com/article/privacy-and-regulation/track-
finally-coming-planned/299536/. I attended the first workshop to explore a do-not-track effort 
in April 2011 at Princeton University, see W3C Workshop on Web Tracking and User 
Privacy, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, https://www.w3.org/2011/track-privacy/ (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2016), and decided at once that the effort was doomed—but I was sorry to be 
proven correct. My interest in the concept of user agents communicating binding privacy 
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B. The Responsive Regulation Model 
All the focus on coregulation bypasses another approach that is already in 
use: responsive regulation. While coregulation focuses primarily on the content of 
rules, responsive regulation is concerned with the method of enforcing the rules, 
regardless of their substance. And while coregulation presupposes many interested 
parties achieving broad consensus, responsive regulation simply influences the 
behavior of a regulator toward all regulated entities. Even when rules have been 
written largely or entirely through traditional governmental processes, they can be 
applied with an eye toward collaboration. Unlike coregulation, which rarely has 
been implemented to govern privacy, responsive regulation of privacy already exists 
in fact. Indeed, it dominates enforcement of privacy law in both Ireland and the 
United States. 
The model of responsive regulation strongly associated with Ayres and 
Braithwaite is typically illustrated as a pyramid. 151  Tactics of dialogue and 
persuasion lie at the broad base of the pyramid; agencies should use these first and 
most frequently.152 Such informal methods often spur regulated entities to improve 
their practices without any official action at all. The government can rely heavily on 
this strategy of advice, exhortation, and industry cooperation, turning to penalties 
only when these methods fail.153 At the next level up the pyramid, methods may be 
more formal but still not directly punitive. A warning letter or a public rebuke might 
get the attention of a company’s leadership. Even an announcement that a practice 
will be investigated can have the desired effect of fixing the problem. The classic 
pyramid then moves up through civil penalties to criminal ones. At the apex of the 
pyramid are “nuclear” weapons such as the revocation of a company’s license to 
operate.154 
Responsive regulation works in a wide range of industries.155 Generally 
speaking, agencies use responsive regulation to relate to businesses under their 
                                                                                                                
preferences goes all the way back to my first piece of published legal scholarship. See William 
McGeveran, Note, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and Web Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1812 (2001). In the interminable discussions surrounding proposals for both do-not-
track and P3P, stakeholders disagreed on fundamental binary decision points, and there was 
no way to move past those disputes without a polder model, Hirsch, supra note 136, at 123–
24, or the types of institutional structures identified by Thaw, see supra note 143, at 371. 
 151. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 35–40; JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 30–34 (2002). 
 152. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 35. 
 153. Id. at 35–48. 
 154. Id.; see also BRAITHWAITE, supra note 151, at 30–34 (summarizing the 
pyramid approach); GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 134, at 396–97. 
 155. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott et al., Soft Law Oversight Mechanisms for 
Nanotechnology, 52 JURIMETRICS J. 279, 286–96 (2012) (identifying 11 “soft law” 
mechanisms for governance of nanotechnology); Stuart Hogarth et. al., Closing the Gaps—
Enhancing the Regulation of Genetic Tests Using Responsive Regulation, 62 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 831, 839–47 (2007) (applying disclosure and guidance strategies to the regulation of 
genetic testing); Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study 
of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735, 
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authority more as partners than as antagonists. At the base of the pyramid, they rely 
upon such “soft law” techniques as education, guidance, dialogue, advice, and 
transparency prior to using adversarial methods.156 Responsive regulatory regimes 
might resolve individual controversies through consultation and dispute resolution 
with companies and the individuals affected by their practices. 157  While the 
underlying possibility of fines or other legal sanctions surely influences the use of 
all of these methods and their success, responsive regulation keeps them in the 
background. If they eventually impose punishments, regulators do so primarily to 
remedy shortcomings, not to seek retribution. As one well-known article explains, 
“regulators begin by assuming virtue (to which they should respond by offering 
cooperation), but when their expectations are disappointed, they respond with 
progressively punitive and deterrent-oriented strategies until the regulatee 
conforms.”158 
Relying on the implied threat of punishment to get results without actually 
imposing the penalty is a very old idea. Parents have probably relied on this method 
since Eve gave birth to Cain and Abel. Sun Tzu described it as a military tactic.159 
Perhaps its most famous invocation in modern times came from Theodore Roosevelt 
in a speech at the Minnesota State Fair, where he advocated that U.S. diplomacy 
should “speak softly but carry a big stick.”160 When he was an early chair of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission in the 1930s, the future Supreme Court Justice 
William O. Douglas explicitly applied the same thinking to regulatory style, arguing 
that government agencies like his ought to “keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind 
the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never 
have to be used.”161 
Ayres and Braithwaite call this the “benign big gun” model of 
enforcement. 162  Perhaps unlike Sun Tzu and Roosevelt’s geopolitical methods, 
however, responsive regulation does not work well if the only penalties a regulator 
can exact resemble all-out war. When the only possible punishments are so serious 
that imposing them would be politically perilous, the threat to use them loses 
                                                                                                                
770–79 (2009) (describing the well-established conciliation process for insurance disputes in 
the United Kingdom). 
 156. GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 134, at 60–69 (reviewing educational 
and information-forcing regulatory instruments); see BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 
111–12 (discussing educational efforts undertaken by data protection regulators in multiple 
jurisdictions); HOOFNAGLE, supra note 15, at 100 (stating that “the FTC’s primary tactic in 
privacy is an information-forcing one, namely the workshop”). 
 157. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 155, at 750–55. 
 158. Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Integrative Regulation: A Principle-
Based Approach to Environmental Policy, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 864 (1999). 
 159. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 77 (Samuel Griffith trans., 1963) (“To subdue the 
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”). 
 160. Ben Welter, Sept. 3, 1901: Roosevelt ‘Big Stick’ Speech at State Fair, STAR 
TRIB. (Minn.) (Sept. 2, 2014, 6:08 PM), http://www.startribune.com/sept-3-1901-roosevelt-
big-stick-speech-at-state-fair/273586721/. 
 161. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (1940). 
 162. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 38–41. 
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credibility.163 Rather, regulators should have a wide range of options available, from 
small consequences to very large ones, but keep them in the background. Regulators 
can then use the specter of penalties for leverage when operating informally at the 
base of the pyramid.164 At the middle levels of the pyramid, some of the agencies’ 
actions might impose consequences, but part of their power remains in the 
possibility of more severe punishments. The largest penalties should be Douglas’s 
metaphorical oiled shotguns, kept the furthest behind the door—but the mere 
knowledge of their existence can influence compliance by regulated entities.165 
Responsive regulation is a general model, not a precise blueprint. The 
specific nature of the actions at every level of the pyramid will differ depending on 
factors like the nature of the regulated industry, the harm caused by infractions, and 
the powers of the regulator. Moreover, no single regulatory formula is ideal for every 
situation. 166  In fact, supporters of responsive regulation and other cooperative 
enforcement strategies usually emphasize that most circumstances call for a well-
considered mixture of strategies, including some more traditional ones.167 Bennett 
and Raab recognized this over a decade ago when they summed up the varied 
functions played by data protection authorities: “Commissioners act, variously, as 
ombudsmen, auditors, consultants, educators, negotiators, policy advisers, and 
enforcers. Not every role is played with equal weight by every commissioner. Nor 
are these functions the exclusive responsibility of the data protection agency . . . .”168 
Billy Hawkes, Ireland’s former Data Protection Commissioner, summarized his 
tasks under Irish law in similar terms: an “enforcer role,” an “ombudsman role,” an 
“educational role,” and a “transparency role.”169 As elaborated in the next Section 
and in Parts III and IV, Ireland and the United States both use the regulatory pyramid 
approach to combine these roles in their privacy enforcement. 
C. Responsive Privacy Regulation 
Several features of privacy compliance make it particularly well-suited to 
responsive regulation. First, responsive regulation works most effectively when 
regulated parties are otherwise motivated to do their best to comply with the law. 
This makes the starting assumption of good faith more likely to be accurate. 
Naturally, many companies seeking to monetize the value of customer data will view 
                                                                                                                
 163. See id. at 45–46. 
 164. Id. at 38. 
 165. See id. at 47–48. As Greenleaf notes, however, these penalties must be serious 
enough to command the attention of regulated entities. See Greenleaf, supra note 19, at 258. 
See generally Hazel Grant & Hannah Crowther, How Effective Are Fines in Enforcing 
Privacy?, in ENFORCING PRIVACY, supra note 15, at 287. 
 166. See id. at 101; GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 134, at 388 (discussing 
how a variety of approaches are best used together). 
 167. See GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 134, at 388–90 (concluding that 
“regulatory pluralism” is necessary for optimal effectiveness). 
 168. BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 109; see also id. at 109–114 (expanding 
on the roles). 
 169. Billy Hawkes, The Irish DPA and Its Approach to Data Protection, in 
ENFORCING PRIVACY, supra note 15, at 441, 442–43. 
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privacy regulation differently than the strongest privacy advocates. Nonetheless, 
few companies see privacy as an area where they strive to get away with as much as 
legally possible. Companies and their investors know that their privacy and security 
practices influence brand value, customer trust, and ultimately, profitability. 170 
Customer-facing companies of all types and sizes develop detailed voluntary 
privacy policies and make them public.171 
These efforts to observe privacy limits that extend beyond the legally 
required minimum contrast with areas where the regulated entity strives to go as far 
as possible without being penalized. Tax enforcement might be such an example: 
most businesses would regard paying even a penny more tax than legally necessary 
to be a blunder.172 Privacy is not an area where the dominant ethos encourages 
companies to push every boundary so long as they have a colorable legal argument 
to defend their behavior. Regulators may still determine that policies or practices are 
inadequate, but at a minimum, most businesses want to portray themselves, and to 
perceive themselves, as safeguarding the privacy of their customers. 
At a minimum, companies’ inclination to embrace best practices helps 
make regulators’ collaborative efforts effective. But responsive regulation may 
actually encourage those motivations. In their empirical study interviewing 
corporate privacy officials in five countries, Bamberger and Mulligan found that 
their interview subjects in the United States and Germany, the countries with the 
more open-textured rules, understood privacy and data protection obligations in 
terms of risk management and the formulation of company policies that match 
consumer expectations, not as a function of compliance with settled law. 173 
                                                                                                                
 170. See Colin Scott, Reflexive Governance, Meta-Regulation, and Corporate 
Social Responsibility: The ‘Heineken Effect’, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 170, 177–82 (Nina Boeger et al. eds., 2008); Ronen Shamir, Capitalism, 
Governance, and Authority: The Case of Corporate Social Responsibility, 6 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 531, 540–44 (2010). For example, both Apple and the FBI concluded that the 
company’s public stand in favor of customer privacy during their highly publicized dispute 
over iPhone encryption enhanced Apple’s brand. See Klint Finley, Apple’s Noble Stand 
Against the FBI Is Also Great Business, WIRED (Feb. 17, 2016), 
http://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-noble-stand-against-the-fbi-is-also-great-business/; 
Will Oremus, Irate DOJ Dismisses Apple’s Fight with the FBI as a ‘Brand Marketing 
Strategy,’ SLATE (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2016/02/19/department_of_justice_motion_mocks
_apple_s_fbi_fight_as_a_brand_marketing.html. 
 171. For the most part, companies post detailed privacy policies voluntarily. See 
MCGEVERAN, supra note 23, at 166–67. California law requires most companies to post 
privacy policies on their websites. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2014). However, 
that law does not mandate the contents or level of detail in these policies, nor does it require 
them to cover data collected through mechanisms other than the website. 
 172. Even in this realm, responsive regulation is on the rise. See Valerie Braithwaite 
et al., Taxation Threat, Motivational Postures, and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y 
137 passim (2007); Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From “Big Stick” to 
Responsive Regulation, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 381, 385–86 (2009). 
 173. BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 16, at 59–104. Their findings are 
consistent with my own interactions with U.S. corporate privacy officials. 
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Corporate officials in Spain and France, where authorities have used responsive 
techniques less readily, had an attitude more oriented toward technical 
compliance.174 This contrast supports the notion that friendlier regulatory styles can 
actually catalyze corporate social responsibility and the formation of privacy-
protective norms, motivated not only by concern about the risk of legal penalties but 
also by other economic and social incentives.175 
Second, rapid technological change increases the benefits of responsive 
regulation. Scholars commonly point out the challenge of keeping the law current 
with developing digital architecture, and with social and business adaptations to that 
technology. It is expensive to keep command-and-control regulations up to date in 
those circumstances.176 A costly game of regulatory whack-a-mole ensues, as the 
rules adjust to new technology or practices, which then adjust to evade the rules. 
Responsive regulation establishes continuing dialogue rather than fixed dictates. 
That makes it a particularly strong response to situations where lawmakers have 
difficulty staying abreast of rapid technological change.177 
By using responsive regulation based on broader principles, regulators can 
secure compliance even as the details of technology change. At the same time, the 
resulting flexibility enables continuous change and improvement of interfaces and 
business methods—indeed, not just enables but encourages it. Rather than giving up 
on the possibility of controlling the inexorable evolution of technology, responsive 
regulation allows agencies to respond to those changes and ameliorate privacy 
impacts without throttling productive innovation.178 
There are, of course, dangers in responsive regulation as well. It can be 
used to cloak inaction and laxity. Some scholars argue that responsive regulation 
increases the likelihood of harmful agency capture or overestimates the rational and 
moral behavior of corporations.179 Furthermore, it can be perceived by the public as 
a charade, undermining confidence in the seriousness of enforcement of the law. In 
addition, if a regulator concentrates too much on private resolution of individual 
                                                                                                                
 174. Id. at 105–143. 
 175. Id. at 219–37; cf. BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 133–34 (discussing these 
factors in the context of self-regulation). 
 176. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 130, at 26. 
 177. Id. 
 178. The Facebook case study considered in Part IV includes an example of 
innovation that could have been throttled by unduly strong and potentially premature 
command-and-control restrictions. See infra notes 290–93 and accompanying text (discussing 
controversy surrounding Facebook’s introduction of its News Feed feature and subsequent 
widespread acceptance of its benefits). 
 179. See, e.g., Sara Singleton, Co‐ Operation or Capture? The Paradox of Co-
Management and Community Participation in Natural Resource Management and 
Environmental Policy-Making, 9 ENVTL. POL., Summer 2000, at 1, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644010008414522 (analyzing capture in locally devolved co-
management of natural resources); Steve Tombs, Understanding Regulation?, 11 SOC. & 
LEGAL STUDS. 113, 126–28 (2002) (book review) (criticizing new governance scholars for 
failing to account for power dynamics and for assuming too much moral and socially 
responsible behavior by corporate entities). 
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complaints and advice, it may fail “to make law general” in a way that shapes other 
parties’ behavior effectively.180 Finally, agencies that rely on responsive regulation 
without “broader political and cultural support for the regulator’s view of the law” 
may find themselves forced either to revert to old-fashioned punitive enforcement 
or to capitulate and relax enforcement entirely.181 
All that said, every approach to regulation includes risks. And there are 
considerable advantages to responsive regulatory techniques. They generally are 
more flexible and cost-effective than the alternatives.182 They also create incentives 
for entities to promote internal compliance and best practices, especially if they 
know that the regulator will look more kindly on alleged lapses where sincere efforts 
have been made to embrace best practices.183 Most of all, in an area like privacy 
regulation, where fixed rules are difficult to articulate, collaboration with 
organizations holding personal data may be the only realistic way to protect 
individual interests. 
Part V will return to some lessons about improving responsive privacy 
regulation to avoid its potential pitfalls. If used wisely, responsive regulation 
techniques can ensure compliance with privacy laws effectively. Part III looks at the 
overall implementation of responsive regulation in Ireland and the United States, 
and Part IV then turns to the specific example of the Facebook case study. 
III. RESPONSIVE PRIVACY REGULATION IN IRELAND AND THE U.S. 
This Part looks at the regulatory strategy adopted by the ODPC in Section 
A and by the main U.S. regulator, the FTC, in Section B. While doing so, it also 
returns to the two questions that opened this Article. First, how does the similar 
regulatory strategy in these two countries bridge gaps between the differing legal 
requirements described in Part I? Second, how does the responsive regulatory 
approach they have chosen actually work? This Part and the Facebook case study in 
Part IV pursue answers to those questions. 
We will see that the two countries’ convergent regulatory styles promote 
comparable best practices in data handling on both sides of the Atlantic. Francesca 
Bignami has traced a convergence of data protection enforcement in Britain, France, 
Germany, and Italy toward “cooperative legalism” that uses “the threat of 
inspections and sanctions to induce market[] actors to take privacy standards 
                                                                                                                
 180. Susan S. Silbey, The Consequences of Responsive Regulation, in ENFORCING 
REGULATION 147, 161–64 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984). 
 181. Christine Parker, The ‘Compliance’ Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive 
Regulatory Enforcement, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 591, 611–13 (2006). 
 182. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 151, at 31–34. 
 183. See, e.g., BAMBERGER & MULLIGAN, supra note 16, at 69–70 (discussing 
reactions to the FTC’s enforcement strategies); cf. Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the 
Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 729–30 
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Act). 
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seriously.”184 Bamberger and Mulligan have found that regulatory behavior helped 
explain similarities in corporate behavior related to privacy in the U.S. and 
Germany.185 So it is with the United States and Ireland. Shortly before he left office 
in 2014, Ireland’s former Data Protection Commissioner, Billy Hawkes, drew the 
same conclusion in a speech: 
As Ireland is a welcoming home for many US multinationals, we have 
a particular interest in aiming for interoperability between EU and US 
models of privacy protection. Privacy is a shared value, as is evident 
from the broad agreement on privacy principles. . . .Recently 
attending a conference in the US, I was struck by the fact that the 
good practice advice from panels was not very different from what 
you would hear at a European event.186 
As for its effectiveness, the remedial actions required by the ODPC under 
Irish law seem generally to satisfy the aggrieved citizens who lodge complaints.187 
The FTC’s consent decrees typically impose 20-year privacy compliance programs 
and continued FTC oversight on companies.188 Those facts provide a partial answer 
to be taken up again in Part IV. 
A. Ireland: The ODPC 
Ireland is a very small country with a comparatively prosperous economy. 
A population of just over 4.5 million makes it the smallest of the long-term (Cold 
War era) E.U. members except for Luxembourg.189 Traditionally, Ireland was also 
considered among the “Poor Four” of those E.U. states along with Portugal, Spain, 
and Greece.190 Then the economy, and especially the real estate market, overheated 
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 190. See Alan Riding, Europe’s ‘Poor 4’ Demand More Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 
1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/05/world/europe-s-poor-4-demand-more-aid.html. 
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during the “Celtic Tiger” boom of the 1990s and early 2000s, leading to a 
devastating crash. Along with the other “Poor Four,” Ireland required an E.U. 
bailout, but it was the first of the four to exit the bailout191 and is now emerging from 
the worst of the financial crisis.192 In 2015, according to the World Bank, Ireland’s 
per capita GDP (adjusted for purchasing power parity) was an enviable $54,654, just 
a tiny bit less than the per capita rate in the United States and higher than that of 
every E.U. member state except Luxembourg. 193  Housing prices and long-term 
unemployment remain serious problems, but Ireland has secured a place as a tiny 
sibling among the first rank of global industrial powers. 
Much of the previous boom and the current recovery derive from Ireland’s 
remarkable success in attracting foreign investment of all kinds, particularly within 
the technology sectors. Forbes Magazine routinely ranks Ireland near the top of its 
annual list of the world’s most pro-business countries.194 And some of the best-
known firms in the information industry—including not only Facebook, but also 
Google, Intel, Apple, Twitter, LinkedIn, PayPal, and eBay—have established large 
operations in Ireland. 195  These Irish outposts manage American companies’ 
activities in many countries: some cover all of Europe, some add the Middle East 
and Africa, and others are responsible for data collected from the entire world 
outside the United States (or, as in Facebook’s case, outside the United States and 
                                                                                                                
 191. Henry McDonald, Ireland Becomes First Country to Exit Eurozone Bailout 
Programme, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2013), 
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http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2013/12/04/ireland-heads-forbes-list-of-the-
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 195. See Breathnach, supra note 10; Burrell, supra note 2. 
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Canada). 196  As of 2014, this rapidly growing information technology sector 
accounted for 40% of Irish exports.197 
There are many reasons why so many high-tech multinationals have set up 
shop in Ireland, most notably Europe’s lowest corporate tax rate and controversial 
rules concerning tax residency and transfer pricing that enable companies to further 
reduce their tax liability.198 Other attractions for U.S. tech companies include a very 
well-educated workforce, low labor costs due to stubborn unemployment rates, and 
universal English. 199  There is reason to believe that regulatory policy further 
contributes to the appeal. Facebook privacy executives have indicated that the 
country’s regulatory environment was one of several reasons the company chose to 
base such a large operation in Ireland.200 Whatever their original motivation for 
setting up second homes in Ireland, technology companies are now a substantial 
presence in Ireland’s still-fragile economy, making cooperative data protection 
enforcement a high priority for the government there. 
Ireland’s original 1988 Data Protection Act established the position of Data 
Protection Commissioner and empowered that official to enforce the Data Protection 
Act across all industries, including the government and non-profit sectors as well as 
businesses of every type.201 While there was little reason at the time to expect the 
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 201. Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 9. 
992 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:959 
ODPC to play a pivotal role in regulating the data-handling practices of so many 
high-tech multinationals from around the globe, the structure laid out in that 1988 
statute remains in place. The underlying law will change when the GDPR becomes 
effective in 2018, but primary regulatory authority will remain with the ODPC 
(subject to some new pan-European procedures, discussed below).202 
The Act’s text directly promotes responsive regulation. One of its key 
provisions allows individuals to file complaints with the ODPC alleging violations 
of data protection law, although the ODPC is also free to pursue actions on its own 
initiative.203 The Act decrees that the ODPC “shall” investigate each complaint 
received unless it is “frivolous or vexatious.”204 The ODPC is obliged to seek an 
“amicable resolution” of such complaints first, and to move to more formal 
processes if this is not possible “within a reasonable time.”205 Those dissatisfied with 
the outcome may appeal to the Irish courts.206 From there, cases may be referred to 
the E.U. judicial system. Schrems, the Austrian privacy activist, took this 
opportunity when displeased with the ODPC’s response to his complaint about 
Facebook transferring data to the U.S. under the Safe Harbor Agreement; he 
appealed to the Irish High Court, and his case went from there to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, the highest in the E.U.207 In addition to striking down Safe 
Harbor, the Court of Justice held that national data protection authorities are obliged 
to exercise their investigatory and enforcement powers in response to citizen 
complaints.208 
This architecture encourages the use of the responsible regulation pyramid. 
The statutory text requires the use of consultation first, and allows a move toward 
more punitive measures if (and only if) those fail.209 Annual reports produced by the 
ODPC demonstrate how these statutory instructions are applied in practice. The 
reports, among other things, provide statistics about the complaints received that 
year and summarize “case studies” of the actions taken and conclusions reached.210 
The statistics indicate that intervention, negotiation, and settlement are a 
great deal more common than adversarial processes at the ODPC. According to its 
annual reports, the ODPC has received between 900 and 1,350 complaints per year 
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since 2007.211 In recent years, about half of all those complaints were related to 
requests by individuals for access to personal data held by a processor.212 Of 829 
complaints resolved in 2014, only 27 resulted in formal decisions by the 
Commissioner.213 This very low percentage is typical of recent years.214 
The annual reports are also full of rather charming case studies involving 
disputes over data handling that were resolved to the satisfaction of the aggrieved 
party through some combination of measures such as an apology, the destruction or 
correction of the person’s records, and reform of the offending practice. One 
illustrative example from 2011, the same year as the ODPC Facebook investigation, 
concerned a complaint by the user of a gym and swimming pool about the excessive 
amount of information solicited on a required medical form. 215  The ODPC 
communicated with the management at the “leisure centre” requesting further 
information, and then determined that the information collected was 
“disproportionate” to its purpose, thus violating the Data Protection Act.216 The 
facility agreed to make completion of the form optional in the future rather than 
mandatory, and to destroy existing forms upon request; the complaining party 
accepted this settlement. The case study concluded: “As a result of this complaint, 
members of the public may now use the swimming pool at the leisure centre on an 
anonymous basis and that is as it should be.”217 The 2014 annual report recounted a 
similar story of a complaint against an apartment broker (called a “letting agency”—
the Irish just have better names for things) that collected excessive amounts of data 
from those merely applying for a rental lease.218 There again, the agency agreed to 
change its practices and the case study concluded: “The complainant informed us 
that she was very satisfied with the outcome of her complaint.”219 These anecdotes 
add detail to the statistical portrait of an agency primarily concerned with assisting 
regulated entities in their efforts to comply with the law and helping citizens reach 
amicable resolutions after violations of their broad data protection rights. 
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Finally, in addition to the statistics and case studies from annual reports, 
statements of ODPC leaders clearly embrace a strategy of responsive regulation. 
The current Commissioner, Helen Dixon, spent 11 years working in the Irish 
outposts of U.S. technology companies before becoming a civil servant in various 
business-related government departments.220 Since she began the job in late 2014, 
Dixon has emphasized collaborative techniques as the cornerstone of her approach. 
In her cover letter in her first ODPC annual report, she expressed her philosophy in 
terms that sound very much like Ayres and Braithwaite, and thus are worth quoting 
at length: 
Given the pace and scale of change, I believe it is essential for data-
protection authorities to have strong relationships with stakeholders, 
and regular meaningful dialogue. The engaged approach adopted by 
my Office means data-protection problems can be detected, and either 
solved or eliminated, before they affect a greater number of people 
than would otherwise be the case. . . . Engagement also means that an 
independent regulator, such as my Office, is better able to guide 
meaningfully and consistently, over time, the broader development of 
data protection for the improved benefit of all parties. 
Sometimes, of course, effective data-protection regulation is best 
carried out through the use of our statutory powers. . . . While the 
explicit use of these tools can be measured, as they are in this report, 
the implicit threat of their use to ensure compliance is also very 
useful, though necessarily harder to capture statistically.221 
In adopting this posture, Dixon is continuing the approach of her 
predecessor, Hawkes, who served as Commissioner from 2005 to 2014. In his first 
annual report, he stated: 
Generally, breaches of data protection legislation are unintentional 
and the majority of data controllers are happy to correct any practices 
that contravene our legislation. 
For the majority of compliant data controllers, my approach is one of 
helping them to achieve better respect for privacy by offering targeted 
guidance. For the minority who [wilfully] or carelessly infringe 
people’s privacy rights, my approach is to use the full extent of my 
powers to achieve quick correction of such behavior.222 
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Statistics, case studies, and policy statements from the regulating authority 
all demonstrate the pervasive use of responsive privacy regulation by the ODPC. 
The ODPC found “excessive” data collection by the leisure centre and the letting 
agency to be unlawful under the Data Protection Act.223 The same practices by the 
same types of entities probably would not violate U.S. consumer protection law 
absent a broken promise, and no other privacy law would be likely to apply. But the 
fact that the underlying rules are more stringent in Ireland than in the U.S. does not 
automatically lead to a harsher regulatory response. 
What sort of “shotgun behind the door” is available to the ODPC in 
instances where it must move higher on the regulatory pyramid? Unlike some other 
E.U. data protection laws, the Irish Data Protection Act does not give the ODPC 
direct authority to impose financial penalties without judicial participation.224 This 
will change under the GDPR, which confers authority on all national data protection 
regulators to levy very large fines—up to 4% of a company’s annual global 
revenue.225 That may improve the ODPC’s influence over businesses at the top of 
the responsive regulation pyramid.226 
Under the Act, the ODPC wields other weapons.227 Using its investigative 
powers, the ODPC may inspect the premises and computer systems of data 
processors at “all reasonable times” and may seize data for investigative purposes.228 
The commissioner also may issue a broad form of subpoena, allowing the ODPC to 
issue compulsory “information notices” to investigate potential data protection 
violations.229 If the ODPC’s efforts to reach a reasonable settlement fail, it may issue 
an “enforcement notice” requiring remedial actions. 230  Typical demands of an 
enforcement notice might include changes in data practices, staff training, and 
correction or deletion of the personal data at issue.231 
                                                                                                                
they will follow that. But if they don’t, we have some of the strongest enforcement powers of 
any European data protection authority.”). 
 223. See Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 2(1)(c)(iii); Irish Data 
Protection Act, supra note 51, §3(a). 
 224. See Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, §31; see, e.g., Lombarte, 
supra note 20, at 124; Dutch Law Includes General Data Breach Notification Obligation and 
Larger Fines for Violations of Data Protection Act, HUNTON & WILLIAMS: PRIVACY & INFO. 
SECURITY L. BLOG (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2016/01/08/dutch-
law-includes-general-data-breach-notification-obligation-and-larger-fines-for-violations-of-
the-data-protection-act/; Julia Floretti, German Privacy Regulator Fines Three Firms Over 
U.S. Data Transfers, REUTERS (June 6, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-
dataprotection-usa-idUSKCN0YS23H. 
 225. See infra notes 376–78 and accompanying text (explaining new GDPR penalty 
structure). 
 226. See infra Section V.A.2 (discussing top-of-pyramid penalties in both the 
United States and Ireland). 
 227. Hawkes has even called them “some of the strongest enforcement powers of 
any European data protection authority.” Mirani, supra note 2. 
 228. Irish Data Protection Act 1988, supra note 50, § 24. 
 229. Id. § 12. 
 230. Id. § 10(2). 
 231. See CAREY, supra note 56, at 157. 
996 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:959 
Failures to cooperate with lawful inspections or to comply with information 
or enforcement notices are punishable offenses. 232  The ODPC can pursue 
prosecution of these infractions in court with summary proceedings, which it has 
done several hundred times over the years.233 Maximum fines in such cases are 
limited to either €3,000 or €5,000, depending on the rules violated.234 An extremely 
serious case could result in criminal indictment and fines up to €100,000 in ordinary 
cases and up to €250,000 for violations involving certain electronic privacy rules.235 
These investigative and enforcement powers are the underpinning of the 
comprehensive data protection audits the ODPC uses to examine organizations of 
all sizes.236 The Facebook investigation discussed in Part IV was such an audit, and 
the ODPC subsequently conducted a similar audit of LinkedIn.237 Other audits of 
companies in recent years have ranged from a trash collection company called Panda 
Waste to a collection of local credit unions.238 Government entities, including the 
national police force and the driver’s license bureau, have also been subjected to 
ODPC audits. 239  In 2014, the ODPC inspected or audited 38 organizations 
altogether.240 Overall, the ODPC has relied for leverage on its power to investigate 
and perhaps ultimately to damage an organization’s reputation and goodwill more 
than on the relatively small and uncommon financial penalties possible under current 
Irish law.241 
A final component of responsive regulation is an emphasis on offering 
education and guidance to help entities bring themselves into compliance with legal 
requirements. 242  The ODPC devotes considerable resources to these activities. 
According to the most recent annual report, the ODPC responded to 860 requests 
for information or assistance with compliance and engaged in 100 more formal 
consultations with public and private organizations. 243  It publishes multiple 
guidance documents, including a 16-page booklet entitled A Guide for Data 
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Controllers, which lays out fundamental principles of data protection law and closes 
with a checklist for privacy compliance.244 While the ODPC offers less material than 
is available on the FTC website, it is clearly a point of emphasis for the ODPC to 
help regulated parties understand the law, answer their own questions, and improve 
their compliance voluntarily. 
B. The United States: The FTC 
As noted before, narrow sectoral statutes in the U.S. give subject-specific 
regulators the authority to promulgate privacy rules and often create data protection 
regimes in their areas of expertise. For example, HIPAA authorizes the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to regulate data handling by 
covered healthcare entities, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
(“FERPA”) gives the U.S. Department of Education power to regulate student 
records at public and private educational institutions.245 
Relying on regulators familiar with the particular concerns of the regulated 
industry has both advantages and drawbacks. Presumably HHS understands 
hospitals and the Department of Education understands schools better than an all-
purpose DPA, such as the ODPC, understands either. On the other hand, such 
division can also lead to fragmented power and reinvented wheels. And overlapping 
authority may cause regulatory competition between agencies, which can have both 
good and bad effects.246 The merits of the sectoral approach have been the subject 
of debate, on which this Article expresses no view. But the differences in national 
approaches to the issue are consistent with the philosophies discussed in Part I: the 
E.U. considers data protection a unified area of law protecting a fundamental right, 
while in the U.S., privacy risk is a characteristic of particular transactions that should 
be addressed in that context. 
For the vast majority of firms that fall outside these more heavily regulated 
sectors, the U.S. takes a consumer protection approach to privacy, and the 
preeminent agency enforcing those requirements is the FTC. 
Unlike Ireland’s Data Protection Act, the structure of the FTC Act does not 
explicitly instruct the agency to pursue friendly regulatory techniques. If anything, 
the statute presupposes that the FTC will do most of its work through adversarial 
enforcement actions. This was especially so after Congress made it prohibitively 
difficult for the Commission to promulgate regulations interpreting Section 5 in the 
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ordinary way under the Administrative Procedure Act.247 That left adjudication as 
the FTC’s primary formal power to police consumer protection violations under 
Section 5. The FTC nonetheless uses responsive regulation to exercise this authority, 
both in its approach to enforcement and in its other activities. 
The FTC accepts complaints from the public, and may use them to identify 
enforcement targets or gather evidence.248 But there is no legal obligation for the 
FTC to resolve individual complaints; indeed, it warns consumers that it may take 
no action in response.249 The FTC can and does commence investigations on its own 
initiative, or at the suggestion of the target company’s competitors.250 Like the 
ODPC, the FTC has a range of information-gathering techniques at its disposal, 
including voluntary requests (backed, of course, by the implied threat of punitive 
action and the desire of the target company to engender goodwill) and various forms 
of compulsory process.251 
Enforcement actions concerning privacy and security routinely result in 
negotiated agreements with the targeted company. 252  In recent years, just three 
companies have chosen to dispute the FTC’s privacy or security claims before a 
judge (either in an administrative process or in district court)253—out of some 170 
such complaints.254 All the others accepted consent decrees creating binding legal 
obligations, which generally include ongoing FTC review of the company’s 
compliance. The FTC’s formal procedures for the formation and content of consent 
orders are rather skeletal.255 In practice, the informal negotiations center on remedial 
actions. The FTC has developed stock language for the remedies commonly 
included in consent decrees, particularly for a company’s adoption of a 20-year 
“privacy compliance program” that incorporates dedicated management of privacy 
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compliance, development of policies, periodic outside audits, and access for the FTC 
to inspect continued adherence to the program.256 
These FTC techniques adhere closely to Ayres and Braithwaite’s pyramid 
model for responsive regulation. The regulatory agency acts under the starting 
assumption that the regulated party intends to do its best to comply with the law. 
Initial contacts are often voluntary and oriented toward remediation. The resolution 
for a first offense is worked out privately between FTC staff and the target of the 
investigation; the complaint and the consent decree typically are unveiled 
simultaneously, and although the public may comment on the proposed remedy, in 
practice this is just a formality before the ratification of the agreed settlement.257 
Once a company is under a consent decree—and remember, 20-year 
durations are common—the FTC gains greater leverage, moving that company, 
which has failed once, higher up the pyramid. The ongoing internal compliance 
program and outside audits, along with the FTC’s power to inspect them, combine 
to put the company on a sort of probation. Crucially, although the FTC cannot 
impose fines for violations of Section 5, once a company is under a consent decree, 
subsequent violations of the consent decree carry potentially significant fines: 
$16,000 per individual violation, which might be multiplied by thousands or even 
millions of users, and levied on a daily basis for continuing violations.258 
Google learned about graduated penalties in the responsive regulation 
pyramid the hard way. In October 2011, just before the Facebook settlement 
discussed in Part IV, Google accepted a consent decree concerning privacy 
violations in the rollout of Google Buzz, one of its several failed attempts to develop 
a social networking platform.259 That order rather broadly required that Google not 
“misrepresent in any manner, expressly or by implication . . . the extent to which 
respondent maintains and protects the privacy and confidentiality of any covered 
information . . . .”260 Ten months later, the FTC reached a new settlement with 
Google, this time for falsely stating that it respected a default setting in the Safari 
browser that blocked certain third-party cookies.261 The complaint in the second 
action did not base liability on a violation of Section 5, although certainly a 
deceptive practices claim might have been brought in the circumstances. Rather, the 
FTC accused Google of violating the previous consent order.262 Because this second 
infraction was now subject to a fine, Google was forced to pay a civil monetary 
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penalty of $22.5 million as part of the settlement.263 The chair of the FTC sounded 
the theme of graduated penalties in a statement about the second enforcement action: 
The record setting penalty in this matter sends a clear message to all 
companies under an FTC privacy order. No matter how big or small, 
all companies must abide by FTC orders against them and keep their 
privacy promises to consumers, or they will end up paying many 
times what it would have cost to comply in the first place.264 
While more study would be necessary to test this theory, it is quite plausible 
that the lack of a monetary penalty in the first enforcement action encourages 
settlement. A company facing the prospect of a significant fine might logically 
expend legal fees to fight the FTC.265 Instead, the cost of any such dispute naturally 
exceeds the zero direct penalty that the company would be charged. There are other 
incentives, of course.266 A company reduces uncertainty by settling, and even gains 
some influence over its future obligations through the negotiations over terms. 
Furthermore, by biting the bullet and settling, a company can reduce the public 
relations damage caused by public airing of government accusations of poor data-
handling practices, enduring just one bad story in the press instead of a protracted 
dispute. Finally, because consent decrees invariably allow the company not to admit 
fault, they can reduce both reputational harm and the risk of subsequent legal 
liability. 
Whatever the incentives to settle, once a company has done so, it finds itself 
higher on the regulatory pyramid—subject to greater oversight, more specific 
obligations, and more significant financial penalties for future privacy failures. The 
FTC has methodically reached consent decrees with many digital technology firms, 
including not only Facebook and Google, but also Microsoft, Twitter, Snapchat, and 
Oracle, to name a few.267 By accumulating consent decrees, the FTC has entrenched 
its role as a regulatory auditor, which encourages companies, in turn, to develop 
internal compliance mechanisms.268 
Over time, the violations alleged in FTC complaints and the conditions 
established in consent decrees offer other regulated companies a picture of the 
Commission’s expectations concerning privacy and security. 269  Steven Hetcher 
explained the early FTC embrace of online privacy policies as a form of norm 
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entrepreneurship that simultaneously defined privacy responsibilities for companies 
and expanded the FTC’s power.270 These consent decrees work in just the same way 
by establishing new expectations for privacy, for both the specific target companies 
and others,271 and solidifying the FTC’s enforcement authority over them. New 
consent decrees are major events within the emerging specialized privacy 
compliance bar in the U.S., whose members assiduously analyze them. This role for 
settlements helps to address any concerns that individualized resolutions under 
responsive regulation might not establish clear and universally applicable legal 
standards.272 
Regulatory resources are always constrained, of course. Like all 
enforcement agencies, the FTC must prioritize its cases, and an examination of its 
chosen targets demonstrates some discernible and predictable patterns. The 
Commission tends to go after larger companies (whose shortcomings affect the most 
consumers), the most egregious offenses (which may be especially likely to cause 
harm, and where enforcement action would be especially important to proscribe as 
a warning to other firms), and infractions involving children’s privacy (where there 
is also heightened harm, as well as clearer political consensus, and additional FTC 
powers under COPPA). In other words, FTC enforcement targets the big guys, the 
bad guys, and those who harm kids.273 The need to prioritize enforcement is part of 
all regulatory approaches, not just the responsive ones, but it means that complaints 
and consent decrees can only do part of the FTC’s job in policing privacy. 
Consistent with the responsive regulation model, the FTC also issues a 
significant quantity of guidance materials to help businesses understand their legal 
responsibilities for privacy and security. For example, while the FTC was 
investigating Facebook (and Google), it was completing a final version of a 
sweeping report concerning privacy recommendations for companies. To create this 
report, the FTC began with a series of roundtables in 2009 and 2010, leading to a 
proposed staff report published for comment at the end of 2010.274 The final report 
was issued in March 2012, months after the Facebook settlement.275 While it offered 
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a broad set of standards rather than detailed regulations, the 2012 FTC Report 
emphasized the importance of developing new products, services, and features with 
consideration of privacy from the earliest stages (so-called “privacy by design”276), 
meaningful choice for consumers, and transparency and consistency about privacy 
practices.277 The report emphasized industry “best practices” rather than formal 
legal compliance measures, maintained flexibility in the face of changing 
technology, and drew insights from engagement with stakeholders to develop legal 
expectations collaboratively.278 
The 2012 FTC Report was a particularly ambitious effort to provide 
guidance for businesses and their lawyers, but certainly not the only one. The FTC 
website houses a “Business Center” with a separate page offering advice for 
companies about privacy and security issues, ranging from two-minute videos and 
short documents highlighting key issues, to a blog, to summaries of recent cases that 
emphasize the takeaway points for other companies so they can avoid committing 
the same violations.279 Two comprehensive but user-friendly guides for businesses 
summarize best practices for data privacy and data security.280 The FTC has also 
convened over 35 topical workshops about privacy issues in the last 20 years and 
issued dozens of reports. 281  Recent workshops and reports tended to focus on 
emerging topics such as cross-device tracking282 or so-called “Big Data” analysis283 
of personal information. 
In summary, despite an authorizing statute that envisions primarily 
adversarial enforcement actions, the FTC has embraced responsive regulation of 
privacy at U.S.-based companies. It has thus emerged as the preeminent privacy 
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regulator in the United States, even though it did so using consumer protection 
powers that have no particular focus on the handling of personal data. 
IV. FACEBOOK: FRIENDING THE REGULATORS 
In 2011, regulators in both the United States and Ireland conducted wide-
ranging enforcement actions related to Facebook’s information-handling practices. 
The FTC reached a settlement with Facebook and then simultaneously announced 
to the public its complaint and a consent decree with a 20-year duration. 284 
Meanwhile, the ODPC completed an audit of Facebook-Ireland, and released its 
comprehensive results, documenting a series of required improvements in 
Facebook’s practices and deadlines for their implementation. 285  These two 
regulatory interventions, conducted simultaneously and completed within weeks of 
one another, make a good comparative case study. They demonstrate the twin theses 
of this Article: that a responsive regulation approach blurs the distinctions between 
otherwise divergent substantive privacy law, and that it can be an effective method 
to improve data practices. 
Around the world, the law has struggled to deal with social media, 
particularly Facebook. Anupam Chander has shown that Facebook’s breathtaking 
global scale and nearly unique degree of interactivity often prompt people to use the 
language of nationhood to describe it, and to ask: “Who rules Facebookistan?”286 
The answer is complex, both because the platform governs itself to a great degree 
through the design of its interface and its terms of use,287 and because the relevant 
jurisdictional rules can be extremely complex.288 Chander chronicles a number of 
attempts by legal systems in various nations to assert their authority over 
Facebookistan, including not only the United States and Ireland, but also Germany, 
France, Canada, China, Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt.289 A comprehensive investigation 
of privacy on Facebook by the Canadian Privacy Commissioner, completed in 2009, 
presaged the findings of the FTC and ODPC in many respects.290 More recently, 
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Facebook prevailed in an appeals court in its challenge against an enforcement 
action by Belgium’s data protection regulator.291 Given Facebook’s vast scale, many 
nations will attempt to influence its operations by asserting legal claims against it. 
Responsive regulatory techniques offer a desirable method for doing so. 
Facebook has always faced criticism and legal challenges over its 
information-handling practices, even before it grew into “Facebookistan.” That was 
already evident in the company’s infancy, when it was still available almost 
exclusively to high school and college students, as explained by Time Magazine in 
2006: 
On Tuesday morning the popular social networking site unrolled a 
new feature dubbed the “News Feed” that allows users to track their 
friends’ Facebook movements by the minute. For many of 
Facebook’s 8 million-plus student users, it was too much. Within 24 
hours, hundreds of thousands of students nationwide organized 
themselves to protest the new feature. Ironically, they’re using 
Facebook to do it.292 
Ten years later, of course, Facebook has quite a few more than eight million 
users around the world, of all ages.293 News Feed, the continuous stream of items 
posted by friends (and other sources chosen by the user), replaced an interface that 
required a user to visit each friend’s profile page individually to see the latest 
updates. It has since become a defining feature of the interface that helped fuel the 
social network’s growth, now so central that it is difficult to imagine Facebook 
functioning without it.294 
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This early controversy over the News Feed exemplifies the broader 
problem technology presents for privacy regulators: it is a fast-moving target. The 
designers of every platform continually experiment with the organization and 
distribution of personal information—including not only Facebook’s 2006 changes, 
but such recent examples as LinkedIn sending emails to people in new members’ 
contact lists inviting them to join the service or Twitter’s experimentation with new 
algorithmic sorting in users’ feeds.295 
“Privacy lurches” can disorient users and depart from their expectations.296 
If new policies contradict previous commitments about privacy, the changes may 
well be illegal under a consumer protection model. If they move beyond legitimizing 
conditions, they might violate data protection law. These sorts of changes increase 
the risks of accidental disclosures to unintended audiences—what human-computer 
interaction scholar Kelly Caine calls “misclosures”297—that are already common 
when using highly networked platforms with complicated interfaces, such as 
Facebook. 
Yet heavy-handed legal intervention against the shift to the News Feed 
would have thwarted an innovation that has proven itself valuable to both the 
company and its customers. The change was controversial at the time because, even 
though personal information posted on a profile was still visible to exactly the same 
audience of approved friends, making it much more readily accessible reduced 
users’ “privacy by obscurity.”298 The company exacerbated the problem by failing 
to recognize these privacy implications and rolling out the new feature too quickly, 
with too little warning, and with an attitude that suggested its users’ reservations 
were foolish.299 Over time, however, users have adjusted to the shift in information 
flows and learned how to protect their privacy. They certainly did not, as some 
observers predicted at the time, leave the service in droves.300 Regulators must leave 
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companies enough room to experiment, and users enough time to adjust, or risk 
thwarting desirable improvements. 
Facebook made another lurching change the next year that probably did 
merit legal intervention. An initiative called Facebook Beacon allowed the social 
network’s advertising partners to disclose information about a person’s online 
activities outside of Facebook on the News Feeds of that person’s friends inside of 
Facebook. 301  This type of “frictionless sharing,” which transmits automated 
messages into Facebook by default rather than by a conscious user action, raises 
many serious problems, including the risk of misclosures, the commercialization of 
individual identity, and the “spammification” of user recommendations that 
undermines their usefulness. 302  The backlash against Beacon was intense and 
Facebook quickly reversed course.303 Founder Mark Zuckerburg later admitted the 
entire effort was a mistake.304 Class action lawsuits, based in large part on state 
consumer protection law, soon followed; the company settled them promptly for 
$9.5 million.305 U.S. regulators like the FTC took no public action as this dispute 
unfolded, despite the clear privacy problems caused by Beacon. 
The News Feed and Beacon controversies were the prologues to the 
investigations by the ODPC and FTC, which generally focused on activities between 
2009 and 2011. As illustrated by the two examples just discussed, Facebook had 
exhibited a somewhat cavalier attitude about user data and a tendency toward 
privacy lurches. It was also clear, however, that the social network was an evolving 
concept and that a heavy-handed regulatory approach could forestall innovation and 
create other problems. The two countries’ regulators acted against that backdrop. 
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In December 2009, Facebook changed its architecture again and adjusted 
its privacy policies accordingly.306 As summarized later in the FTC’s complaint, 
several of these changes altered the categories of personal information over which 
users could restrict access, converting some to “publicly available” when users 
previously could set those same categories as “visible” only to their friends or to 
“friends of friends.”307 Meanwhile, some types of information became more readily 
accessible to the makers of applications that run within Facebook, and the unique 
Facebook ID was available to some advertisers—all allegedly with inadequate 
disclosures of these facts by Facebook. 308  Moreover, some of these changes 
automatically superseded previous user privacy settings that were stricter. 309 
Facebook implemented the modifications by requiring every user to click through a 
“Privacy Wizard” interface confirming privacy settings, but the FTC objected that 
the Wizard presented the new policies in a misleading way.310 Some of these policy 
revisions were controversial immediately; privacy advocacy groups such as the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center called on the FTC to investigate.311 
As noted earlier, FTC privacy cases almost always settle, resulting in no 
fine for a first infraction but requiring improvements in data-handling practices and 
long-term FTC monitoring and internal compliance programs.312 That is exactly 
what happened after the FTC presented its complaint to Facebook. Like many other 
privacy consent decrees entered by the FTC, Facebook’s also had a 20-year term, 
and it obliged Facebook to establish a “comprehensive privacy program,” to conduct 
biennial audits of its privacy performance, and to make certain records available to 
the FTC on request.313 In another resemblance to typical FTC consent decrees, 
Facebook did not admit wrongdoing. 
What sets the Facebook Order apart from most other consent decrees is a 
set of conditions that the company “clearly and prominently” announce changes to 
the mechanisms for disclosing users’ personal information.314 The consent decree 
includes detailed requirements for these announcements, drawn from the FTC’s 
consumer-protection expertise. 315  Facebook would not be subject to similar 
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restrictions under the FTC’s normal jurisdiction, so in effect, the Commission used 
the settlement as leverage to increase Facebook’s substantive privacy 
responsibilities for the following two decades. And, as usual, failure to meet these 
heightened duties can now trigger a potentially significant fine.316 
Meanwhile, Facebook’s practices during the post-Beacon period were of 
particular interest to the ODPC, because the company opened its European 
headquarters in Dublin in 2008. After opening this subsidiary in Ireland, Facebook 
altered its terms of service so that its contractual relationship with all users outside 
the United States and Canada connected them to the Facebook-Ireland subsidiary, 
rather than to the main U.S.-based company.317 There are now over 1,000 employees 
in Facebook’s Dublin office, the biggest concentration outside its global 
headquarters in Silicon Valley.318 Under the current Data Protection Directive, the 
presence of this rest-of-world headquarters gives Ireland primary jurisdiction over 
the company’s data-handling practices.319 
According to the ODPC, it unilaterally selected Facebook for a 
comprehensive data protection audit at the beginning of 2011.320 In August and 
September of that year, a privacy advocacy group called Europe Versus Facebook 
filed a series of 22 specific complaints about Facebook with the Commissioner.321 
Europe Versus Facebook was created by Maximilian Schrems, the Austrian privacy 
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activist who colorfully criticized Ireland as the Cayman Islands of the data barons.322 
These complaints were absorbed into the audit as well.323 
The ODPC Facebook Audit laid out a detailed set of changes and 
improvements in Facebook’s data practices. The regulator and the company 
negotiated over the list, and in the end, Facebook accepted the recommended 
improvements.324 One of the major areas concerned the clarity of disclosures made 
to users, especially in light of the complexity of Facebook’s privacy settings and 
retroactive changes in them—precisely the issues central to the FTC inquiry. In 
response, Facebook agreed to increase its transparency to users, with continued 
follow-up from the ODPC to ensure that the improvements are sufficient.325 In some 
instances, such changes were spelled out in great detail: for the then-novel feature 
of suggested photo tags based on facial recognition, for example, Facebook was 
required to provide additional notice to users under the following guidelines: 
[The notice] will appear at the top of the page when a user logs in. If 
the user interacts with it by selecting either option presented then it 
will disappear for the user. If the user does not interact with it then it 
will appear twice more for a total of 3 displays on the next successive 
log-ins.326 
Finally, like the FTC, the ODPC established an ongoing process for 
monitoring compliance. As a start, the regulator conducted a follow-up audit the 
next year to assess Facebook’s progress toward promised improvements.327 It found 
that “most of the recommendations have been implemented to [the ODPC’s] 
satisfaction” and for the remainder it provided detailed work plans for Facebook to 
cooperate with the ODPC in meeting those goals by specified deadlines.328 
Overall, the ODPC was sufficiently satisfied with the results of its 
interactions with Facebook to use the same model again in 2014, when it completed 
a similar audit of the Irish headquarters of another social networking platform, 
LinkedIn.329 Dixon has indicated her intention for the ODPC to conduct similar 
audits of Apple, Adobe, and Yahoo! in the near future.330 
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Understandably, Facebook presented the results of the two investigations 
in the best possible light. It is intriguing how closely the company’s statements 
adhere to the responsive regulation playbook. In a long blog post the day the FTC 
settlement was announced, Zuckerberg cast it in terms of dialogue and improvement 
and pointedly placed Facebook alongside other large digital technology companies: 
As we have grown, we have tried our best to listen closely to the 
people who use Facebook. We also work with regulators, advocates 
and experts to inform our privacy practices and policies. Recently, 
the [FTC] established agreements with Google and Twitter that are 
helping to shape new privacy standards for our industry. Today, the 
FTC announced a similar agreement with Facebook. These 
agreements create a framework for how companies should approach 
privacy in the United States and around the world. 
For Facebook, this means we’re making a clear and formal long-term 
commitment to do the things we’ve always tried to do and planned to 
keep doing—giving you tools to control who can see your 
information and then making sure only those people you intend can 
see it.331 
Notice in particular how this statement envisions a cooperative effort 
between the regulator and companies to “shape new privacy standards for our 
industry.”332 Facebook, by friending the FTC, is pulling it closer. In return, however, 
the FTC gets powerful influence over the design of privacy rules throughout the 
industry. When discussing the Irish audit, a senior official at Facebook-Ireland 
similarly emphasized areas where the ODPC found its practices laudable: 
Of course, Facebook is always looking to improve our privacy 
policies and practices, and the [ODPC’s] review of our existing 
operations highlighted several opportunities to strengthen our 
existing practices. Facebook has committed to either implement, or 
to consider, other “best practice” improvements recommended by the 
[ODPC], even in situations where our practices already comply with 
legal requirements.333 
Again, the ethos of responsive regulation permeates this statement. Rather 
than focusing on the specific details of rules, Facebook highlights advice from and 
communication with the ODPC and describes improvements as steps toward best 
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practices, not as the fulfillment of legal obligations. The same official told the BBC, 
“This is business as usual for us. Individuals raise concerns and take them to the 
regulatory authorities and we have a conversation with them.”334 
These friendly resolutions drew critics in both Ireland and the United 
States. According to Hawkes, some other European regulators objected to the 
outcome of the Facebook audit.335 Much of the reaction to the FTC consent decree 
was likewise unimpressed, particularly in the heated world of technology blogs. A 
story on the website for Wired Magazine epitomized the common journalistic 
takeaway, calling it a “win for Facebook” and noting pointedly that the company 
was not required to admit fault.336 The article began: 
Facebook is settling government charges it “deceived” users that their 
information would be kept private, although it was “repeatedly” 
shared with the public, the [FTC] announced Tuesday. 
The deal, which carries no financial penalties, demands that the 
social-networking site obtain “express consent” of their 850 million 
users before their information “is shared beyond the privacy settings 
they have established.”337 
These criticisms focused on the lack of a clear punishment for Facebook. 
But responsive regulation does not depend on punishments to achieve results, and 
Facebook’s overall privacy performance has improved considerably since 2011. 
Most significantly, Facebook has greatly expanded and formalized its 
privacy compliance functions. As part of this effort, every product manager now 
receives intensive privacy training and an internal privacy team carefully monitors 
the design of new features.338 The creation of this “comprehensive privacy program” 
is very much in line with the recommendations of both the FTC and the ODPC. The 
involvement with product development epitomizes the FTC’s “privacy by design” 
mantra.339 
On its own initiative, without specific mandates from either regulator, 
Facebook also developed a new “privacy checkup tool,” depicted in Figure 1, that 
periodically interrupts users when they log in and directs them to evaluate their 
                                                                                                                
 334. Irish Privacy Watchdog Calls for Facebook Changes, BBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-16289426. 
 335. See Mark Tighe, Data Commissioner: I Was Not Too Soft on Facebook, 
SUNDAY TIMES (UK) (Jan. 7, 2012), 
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/ireland/News/Irish_News/article853298.ece. 
 336. David Kravets, FTC Slaps Facebook’s Hand Over Privacy Deception, WIRED 
(Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/11/ftc-slaps-facebook-privacy/. 
 337. Id. Technology bloggers reacted similarly to a more recent consent decree 
involving social network privacy, this one against Snapchat. One story began: “The [FTC] 
today effectively told technology companies: Go ahead and lie to consumers about your 
privacy protections, because even if you get caught, the most you’ll have to do is apologize.” 
Larson, supra note 4. 
 338. See Kashmir Hill, The Guy Standing Between Facebook and Its Next Privacy 
Disaster, FUSION (Feb. 4, 2015), http://fusion.net/story/41870/facebook-privacy-yul-kwon/. 
 339. See supra notes 267–271 and accompanying text. 
1012 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:959 
settings before proceeding. 340  The tool, 341  pictured below, ensures that users 
reassess their own privacy—because not only might the architecture of Facebook 
change, but the individual user’s preferences, habits, and personal relationships may 
alter over time. 
 
Figure 1: The Facebook Privacy Checkup Tool. 
As a final indication of its increasing privacy consciousness, Facebook was 
the first large platform to require a search warrant for government investigators’ 
requests for user data, rather than handing it over voluntarily.343 This last position 
may not be one that government regulators value, but it is important to users. 
The FTC and ODPC have continued to scrutinize Facebook since their 
2011 investigations. In 2013, Facebook again altered its privacy policy. 344 U.S. 
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privacy advocacy groups sent a letter to the FTC (not quite a formal complaint, but 
with similar effect) arguing that the Commission should block the new rules.345 With 
considerable publicity, the FTC let it be known that it was inquiring into whether 
the new policy violated the 2011 agreement.346 This was part of the continued 
scrutiny envisioned in the consent decree, and in response, Facebook hastily 
explained that the new policy language was merely an attempt to clarify terms 
without changing them substantively—one of the goals embodied pervasively in 
both the FTC and ODPC actions.347 Facebook eventually agreed to further changes 
in response to the regulators’ concerns.348 
More recently, the FTC and other regulators expressed concern about 
Facebook’s activities in connection with its acquisition of the popular messaging 
platform WhatsApp. After the WhatsApp transaction in 2014, the FTC 
proactively—and publicly—wrote to Facebook and invoked both Section 5 and the 
consent decree, warning, “[I]f you choose to use data collected by WhatsApp in a 
manner that is materially inconsistent with the promises WhatsApp made at the time 
of collection, you must obtain consumers’ affirmative consent before doing so.”349 
In August 2016, the company announced that some personal data about WhatsApp 
customers, which had remained segregated from the rest of Facebook’s data, would 
henceforth be shared.350 Individual users received clear notice of the change from 
prompts in the app that required them to accept the new terms and allowed them to 
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opt out of the data disclosures.351 The FTC has indicated that it will “carefully 
review” these changes.352 That evaluation will boil down to deciding whether the 
opt-out procedures Facebook offered were close enough to the requirements of the 
2011 consent decree and the FTC’s 2014 call for “affirmative consent.” 
The new WhatsApp policy attracted considerable negative commentary.353 
But analysis of the changes will require a careful and nuanced balance: keeping 
individuals informed and in control of their personal data, while letting technology 
businesses evolve to offer innovative services and—not incidentally—make money. 
It is a close call. The conscientious rollout of these changes shows Facebook has 
come a long way from its privacy lurches prior to 2011. Collaborative engagement 
by regulators such as the FTC will be more likely to resolve the question than a 
simplistic ex ante rule or premature resort to punitive measures. 
The Irish regulator similarly continued its use of collaborative techniques, 
before, during, and after its audit. Ever since the Dublin office opened, the ODPC 
and Facebook have both continuously emphasized their ongoing discussions about 
data protection practices. For example, the audit report highlighted a visit by then-
Commissioner Hawkes to Facebook’s U.S. headquarters in 2010.354  Dixon, the 
current Commissioner, has stated more recently that her staff continues to be in 
weekly and sometimes daily contact with Facebook-Ireland.355 As already noted, the 
ODPC conducted and published a 2012 follow-up audit assessing Facebook’s 
progress in making improvements from the original audit.356 And in 2016, Facebook 
made a number of changes in its configuration in response to “intense engagement” 
with the ODPC.357 
In the abstract, such constant communication between the regulator and 
one of the most significant businesses under its authority could be seen as either 
excessively chummy or intensively meddlesome, depending on the circumstances 
and one’s point of view. Here, it appears to be neither. Consistent with a responsive 
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regulation model, Facebook kept regulators informed of its activities and they, in 
turn, helped the company stay within the boundaries of acceptable practices. 
By friending the privacy regulators, Facebook availed itself of an 
authoritative source to consult about its legal obligations and protected itself from 
future penalties. If Facebook is in constant contact with a regulator and following 
its advice, how can that regulator then complain about Facebook’s actions? 
From a regulator’s perspective, this outcome should be counted as a 
success.358 Facebook has established the elaborate compliance monitoring the FTC 
wanted, and the consent decree gives the FTC continued leverage over Facebook 
until it expires in 2032. Facebook also continues to consult the ODPC about its 
obligations. After all, the regulators’ goal is to improve data privacy practices, and 
Facebook is now obeying the law as the FTC and the ODPC interpret it. Moreover, 
responsive regulation achieves that goal in a way that keeps costs low both for the 
government and for the job-creating economic engine at Facebook. 
The flexible outcomes of the two regulatory interventions, along with the 
continued consultation they established, also mean that privacy requirements on 
Facebook can continue to adapt as the technology, business methods, and cultural 
expectations of social media continue to change. A ruling that bluntly forbids an 
innovation might inadvertently prevent beneficial developments, such as the 
creation of the News Feed. Using responsive regulation, the FTC and ODPC can 
intervene to discuss new features and policies, offer alternate views, and promote 
privacy. Indeed, they can effectively require such changes, because Facebook is now 
subject to greater scrutiny in the middle portion of the regulatory pyramid. 
Finally, the regulatory friendship allows Facebook to present itself to the 
world as privacy-conscious—but this good publicity comes at the price that it in fact 
maintain strong practices, or the resulting legal and reputational harm could be 
especially serious. In other words, by allowing their new friends at Facebook to brag 
about data practices, the regulators have helped maximize the business incentives 
for continued advancement of privacy. 
V. LESSONS AND FUTURE STUDY 
This final Part considers some of the lessons emerging from this study of 
responsive regulation in data privacy enforcement and the next steps toward 
understanding it. Section A discusses three lessons about the effectiveness of this 
regulatory strategy that we can learn from the implementation of the model in 
Ireland and the United States. Section B briefly notes some avenues for future study 
of this insufficiently theorized area. 
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A. Lessons 
1. Resources 
Responsive regulation is often championed because it is cost-effective in 
comparison to command-and-control rulemaking and adversarial proceedings. 
While that is true, successful responsive regulation is not cheap either. In particular, 
successful privacy enforcement necessitates the resources to obtain technical 
expertise.359 
According to Hawkes, completion of the ODPC Facebook Audit required 
three months of full-time work by one-third of his entire staff, which totaled only 22 
people at the time.360 That level of engagement could overwhelm an office that was 
a relatively sleepy operation for many years. Until recently, the ODPC’s budget and 
staff were designed to oversee “leisure centres” and “letting agencies” 361—not 
global technology behemoths like Facebook.362 
To the derision of its critics, the ODPC has long been headquartered over 
a Centra convenience store in the small village of Portarlington in County Laois, 75 
kilometers southwest of Dublin. 363  This unusual location resulted from a past 
government’s short-lived decentralization policy that moved offices outside the 
capital,364 but some viewed the backwater location as proof that the ODPC was not 
up to the job of policing technology multinationals.365 
In 2015, the Irish government initiated a massive increase in the resources 
and status of the ODPC. That year, the budget grew from €1.8 million to €3.65 
million, and the number of employees rose from 29 to 50.366 In 2017, the ODPC’s 
budget is slated for another enormous gain, to over €7.5 million (equivalent to over 
$8 million)—quadruple the 2014 budget.367  The current government also made 
organizational changes to upgrade the ODPC’s institutional status and bureaucratic 
                                                                                                                
 359. See BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 18, at 177. 
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independence.368 At the same time, it created a new position of a Minister for Data 
Protection within the Office of the Taoiseach (Ireland’s prime minister) and filled it 
with a member of Ireland’s parliament who also has responsibilities as a Minister of 
State for European Affairs.369 Finally, the ODPC opened a second office in 2016—
this one located on a landmark square in central Dublin.370 
The enhanced budget and authority—and even the more dignified office 
space—should help the ODPC go about its job. The Irish regulators will continue to 
rely on their investigative and audit powers as central features of their responsive 
regulation approach, but these are labor-intensive undertakings. For Dixon to follow 
through on her stated plans to audit other large technology companies in a manner 
similar to the Facebook review, those enhancements will be important.371 
It is more difficult to ascertain the resources devoted to privacy 
enforcement by U.S. regulators, because those functions are subsumed in larger 
agencies. According to documentation the FTC has submitted to Congress, it had 57 
full-time staff positions related to its “Privacy and Identity Protection” function in 
the 2015 fiscal year, and a budget for these functions of just under $10 million.372 
Those numbers are a bit higher than the ODPC—but for a nation with a population 
some 80 times larger than Ireland’s. 
This comparison could be somewhat misleading for several reasons, First, 
the FTC is only one of multiple U.S. agencies enforcing privacy law. For a full 
accounting, one would need to add all the resources devoted to privacy regulation 
by state attorneys general and by numerous other federal agencies such as HHS, the 
Department of Education, and the U.S. financial regulatory bodies. To take just one 
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example, the division of HHS most directly responsible for enforcement of HIPAA 
had a budget in Fiscal Year 2015 of just under $6.8 million,373 which by itself 
approaches the ODPC’s entire budget. In addition, remember that the ODPC must 
oversee, not only every industry, but also the public sector. Finally, while the ODPC 
is a free-standing entity, privacy regulators at larger agencies such as the FTC and 
HHS can rely on other less specialized staff in their agencies (such as lawyers, office 
technology, or meeting planning), so counting only the staff fully devoted to privacy 
may understate the available support. Even with all that, it still seems unlikely that 
the combined budgets of U.S. privacy regulators would add up to $640 million, as 
would be necessary to have roughly the same spending per capita as Ireland will 
have next year. 
Setting aside the comparison, it is probable that funding for both U.S. and 
Irish privacy regulators is too limited. Privacy regulators’ staff sizes differ widely, 
but both the ODPC and the FTC are much smaller than several countries’ DPAs that 
have over a hundred employees, including those in France, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom.374 
By the nature of government, regulators almost always operate under 
resource constraints. Nevertheless, modest budgets and staffing surely force these 
agencies to decline regulatory interventions that would be prudent. That does not 
necessarily mean the extra money should be spent on adversarial enforcement. But 
communication with regulated entities, development of educational materials and 
guidance, and preliminary investigation all cost money, too. This is an area for 
further improvement in both countries. 
2. Penalties 
As described earlier, the classic theory of responsive regulation requires a 
“benign big gun” that remains behind the door, loaded, and well oiled.375 We have 
established that the gun in regulatory friending is benign, but is it sufficiently loaded 
and oiled? Do the penalties available at the top of the regulatory pyramid create 
sufficient leverage when negotiations occur at lower levels of that pyramid? 
Perhaps the most obvious penalty—and the one that critics of the 
collaborative approach taken by the FTC and ODPC seem to expect376—would be a 
monetary fine. Even had they wished to impose a fine on Facebook in the first 
instance, neither the ODPC nor the FTC had the power to do so at the time. 
                                                                                                                
 373. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE CIVIL RIGHTS, FISCAL YEAR 2016 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 27–29 (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/budget/office-of-civil-rights-budget-justification-
2016.pdf. 
 374. See David Wright, Enforcing Privacy, in ENFORCING PRIVACY, supra note 15 
at 13, 29–30 (listing the number of employees working for various data protection authorities 
around the world as of 2013). 
 375. See supra notes 160–166 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
2016] PRIVACY REGULATORS 1019 
Under the current Data Protection Act in Ireland, a financial penalty is 
likely only in the rare prosecutions that reach court, and even there the maximum 
sums are modest, typically just a few thousand euros.377 The GDPR will usher in a 
dramatically different penalty structure, which will automatically take effect in 
Ireland in 2018. Its graduated administrative fines are complicated, but in the most 
serious cases could amount to 4% of a company’s global annual turnover—that is, 
revenue.378 In preparation for its initial public offering, Facebook reported gross 
revenue in 2011 of $3.7 billion.379 Thus, if the ODPC had been able to conduct its 
2011 Facebook investigation under the new 2018 rules, it theoretically could have 
fined the company up to $148 million if it uncovered very serious privacy flaws. 
Certainly, a fine of this magnitude would be a potent regulatory weapon. 
In fact, the maximum fine is so large that a threat to impose it might not be terribly 
credible.380 Under the graduated penalty structure, the ODPC would also have the 
option of charging an amount that is considerably lower than 4% of revenue, but 
still significant. 
The FTC cannot fine an entity either, at least not when relying solely on its 
powers under Section 5. As noted previously, the FTC can parlay a consent decree 
entered for a first offense into fines for subsequent infractions, as it did against 
Google.381 The FTC also enjoys the authority to fine companies for violations of 
other statutes such as COPPA, and it has exercised this power frequently to extract 
civil penalties in settlements.382 A few U.S. regulators can impose very large fines. 
The California Attorney General recently settled a consumer-protection suit with 
Comcast, which had carelessly published telephone numbers of customers who had 
paid to have unlisted numbers.383 The price tag was a $25 million civil penalty plus 
nearly $8 million in restitution.384 In the foreseeable future, however, the FTC will 
not have traditional fining authority in the bulk of its consumer protection 
jurisdiction, except over companies already covered by consent decrees. 
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The FTC does have some powers fairly high up the pyramid that can help 
cajole companies into compliance. Even the initiation of an FTC investigation is 
viewed by many regulated entities as a serious problem. The imposition of ongoing 
oversight in consent decrees is even more significant. One U.S. corporate privacy 
official interviewed by Bamberger and Mulligan went so far as to call the possibility 
of operating under a decree a “Three-Mile Island scenario” that motivated top 
executives in the firm to take privacy and security issues seriously.385 So, while the 
FTC’s regulatory pyramid may not rise to quite as high a peak as those of some other 
American regulators, and certainly not to where E.U. regulators will reach under the 
GDPR, the FTC’s top-of-the-pyramid penalties still manage to alarm and motivate 
corporate privacy managers and their bosses. 
That said, the FTC would probably be able to act more effectively, even as 
a friendly regulator, if it had the power to levy fines under Section 5. A regulator 
does not need to impose its most severe punishments often, or perhaps at all, to 
influence all other cases.386 The risk of being subjected to an investigation or a 
consent decree for poor data-handling practices, while meaningful, is presumably 
not as potent a disincentive as a direct financial penalty. If the agency retained the 
money raised by fines, it could also use them to provide some of the necessary 
resources identified in Section III.A.1, above. 
3. Accountability 
Behind much of the criticism of friendly privacy regulation is a suspicion, 
stated or implied, that regulators might be captured by companies. In order to 
maintain accountability, responsive regulation must be responsive not only to 
companies, but also to the public, advocacy groups, the media, and legislators. 
In Ireland, several formal mechanisms foster that accountability and help 
prevent the ODPC from entering an overly cozy friendship with regulated entities. 
First, as mentioned previously, the ODPC acts on every complaint it receives.387 
Admittedly, a fully captured agency could give short shrift to many complaints. But 
a formal complaint mechanism still provides an opportunity for ordinary citizens to 
disrupt any capture dynamic. The ODPC’s annual reporting of statistics about the 
disposition of complaints further enhances this accountability function.388 Besides, 
capture is possible no matter what punishments agencies can or do impose—
transparent procedures and strong ethics rules are more effective prophylactics 
against capture, regardless of the regulatory approach adopted.389 
Not only does the complaint procedure itself enhance accountability, but 
people dissatisfied with the ODPC’s initial response can challenge it in court. This 
is exactly what Schrems did in his Safe Harbor case objecting to the ODPC’s 
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dispositions of some of his complaints against Facebook.390 The Data Protection Act 
instructs the ODPC to issue formal decisions even when it elects to take no further 
action.391 While the Irish courts adhere to a doctrine of “curial deference” with 
regard to administrative agencies, they do serve as a check against actions that are 
arbitrary, unduly credulous toward industry, or contrary to the judicial 
understanding of the law, as demonstrated, again, by the Schrems Safe Harbor 
litigation. 392 Serious challenges may then be referred from Irish courts to E.U. 
courts, as happened in Schrems. 393  Possible intervention by E.U. courts helps 
prevent a “race to the bottom” on data protection by Irish institutions, whether 
regulatory or judicial.394 Too great a departure from established E.U. data protection 
norms can and will be overturned. 
Nor is judicial review the only external check on the ODPC’s enforcement 
choices.395 Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive established an advisory body 
composed of representatives from each nation’s data protection regulatory agency 
and from the European Commission.396 The so-called “Article 29 Working Party” 
issues detailed opinions interpreting the requirements of E.U. data protection law.397 
While these determinations are only advisory, they are highly influential. National 
and E.U. courts cite them as persuasive authority and there is strong institutional 
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pressure for national regulators not to stray too far from the consensus of their 
peers.398 
The GDPR will introduce additional restraints. The ODPC would continue 
to function as the “lead supervisory authority” with jurisdiction over companies that 
have their “main establishment” in Ireland. 399  Consequently, the ODPC will 
maintain significant influence over data protection enforcement against Facebook, 
Google, Apple, and all the other technology giants who have their largest European 
presence on Irish soil. This lead supervisory authority is not, however, exclusive 
power, as was envisioned in some earlier proposals for a “one stop shop” regulatory 
structure in the EU.400 Rather, the GDPR sets up a consultation process for a primary 
regulator like the ODPC to confer with data protection regulators in other countries 
where people were affected by a challenged data-handling practice.401 A newly 
created European Data Protection Board will resolve disagreements between 
national regulators about the regulatory approach taken.402 
It remains to be seen, in 2018 and beyond, exactly how the E.U. will 
structure this new Board and the consultation process. These conformity 
mechanisms must try to balance the sovereign interests of E.U. member states with 
the Union’s objective of harmonizing law across the integrated European market.403 
The prospects for responsive regulation within that structure will be an important 
area for future study. If E.U. member states meddle with one another, national 
regulators like the ODPC could find themselves hindered from using more 
collaborative techniques. If handled with respect for national choices of regulatory 
style, however, these additional accountability mechanisms may simply provide 
further assurance that friendly regulation does not become crony regulation. 
The FTC is not subject to many formal mechanisms of this nature. The 
Commission is not required to act on complaints, and citizens cannot challenge 
regulatory inaction in court, or elsewhere. Public comments on consent decrees 
seldom have any impact.404 Greater institutional accountability might be desirable 
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to reduce the risk of capture, empower individuals, and increase public acceptance 
of the FTC’s regulatory choices. 
One accountability mechanism that is stronger in the United States than in 
Ireland is a comparatively robust privacy advocacy community. 405 
Nongovernmental organizations such as the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, 406  the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 407  the Center for Democracy and 
Technology, 408  and many others serve as watchdogs and gadflies to prevent 
inappropriate behavior by regulatory agencies. When these organizations call on 
regulators to act, they can also mobilize press coverage, questions from sympathetic 
members of Congress, and grassroots pressure from their members.409 
Privacy advocacy in Ireland is more limited. Digital Rights Ireland410 has 
made considerable inroads, including a successful E.U. court case to overturn a data 
retention directive that it argued compromised citizen privacy in relation to law 
enforcement. 411  Groups from other E.U. countries (including Schrems’s 
organization) also intercede in Ireland.412 Even so, scrutiny of the ODPC by NGOs 
and media may be somewhat less intense than what the FTC receives. It might also 
be less important in light of the formal accountability mechanisms in Irish and E.U. 
law that are missing in the United States. Perhaps such groups in both countries 
could be further strengthened by means that Ayres and Braithwaite call “tripartism,” 
where external watchdogs have access to information held by regulators, increasing 
their power to prevent capture or collusion between government and industry.413 
B. Further Study 
Privacy scholars have begun to pay more attention to the actual practices 
of privacy regulation “on the ground.” Yet the map of that space is far from 
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complete. 414  Research such as Bennett’s groundbreaking work; 415  Bignami’s 
empirical study of data protection regulatory styles in four European countries;416 or 
Bamberger and Mulligan’s comprehensive examination of corporate behavior417 
blazed the trail toward the study of real practices rather than just formal law. Recent 
scholarly examinations of the institutional role of particular regulatory agencies in 
the overall enforcement scheme add important details to the map.418 
This Article has added an analysis of responsive regulation as an effective 
privacy enforcement tool, and a focus on the especially important practices of 
Ireland’s DPA. But there is much more to be done to expand the examination here 
across several dimensions. One important path to continue exploring is 
methodological. Observation and interviews with regulatory officials would 
contribute greatly to understanding the motivations and rationales for the choices 
they make.419 This form of observational case study is very well established in the 
responsive regulation literature outside of the privacy context.420 
Another fruitful trail would be an extension of the inquiry to other 
regulatory agencies and other statutes. Why does the ODPC make different choices 
of regulatory approaches than some other European regulators, and how do the 
results of these different approaches compare? Among U.S. regulators, this Article 
has focused on the FTC exercising its Section 5 authority. Sectoral U.S. privacy 
regulators such as HHS and the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights 
broadly emulate the responsive approach taken by the FTC. And the FTC itself 
embraces responsive regulation techniques under COPPA, which is a data protection 
statute. Likewise, Jane Winn has described the Red Flags Rule, developed jointly 
by the FTC and financial regulatory agencies to reduce financial identity theft risk, 
as an example of new governance techniques.421 
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Finally, it is not certain that responsive regulation is equally effective in all 
aspects of data privacy enforcement: do lessons shaped by the social media case 
study in this Article extend fully to areas such as regulation of data breaches or de-
identification of personal information? 
These questions help to shape a research agenda for this author and other 
scholars that will both critique existing regulatory models and contribute to their 
improvement. 
CONCLUSION 
Adversarial combat is not the only effective mode of regulation. New 
governance scholars have explained the benefits of models like responsive 
regulation. Techniques of collaboration, flexibility, and the carefully graduated 
penalties of the regulatory pyramid work well for enforcement of privacy and data 
protection law. They help regulators to encourage companies to improve their 
practices continually, retain the flexibility to deal with changing technology, and 
discharge their oversight duties cost-effectively—while maintaining the well-oiled 
“shotgun behind the door” as an incentive for companies to comply. 
In addition, when regulators under different legal regimes share this 
cooperative regulatory approach, it bridges gaps between them and can enable 
companies to develop common global strategies based on best practices that comply 
with legal requirements in disparate jurisdictions. This makes the theoretically sharp 
differences between countries less significant in practice. 
There is room for improvement of responsive privacy regulation, and many 
topics require further exploration. Nevertheless, the case study examined here—the 
regulatory styles used in the U.S. and Ireland, particularly with regard to their 
parallel investigations of Facebook—suggest that “regulatory friending” works 
effectively in the privacy context. Collaboration gives companies more clarity about 
their compliance obligations and minimizes their risk of being surprised by an 
adversarial regulatory action. Meanwhile, regulators can improve real-world data 
practices efficiently, flexibly, and cooperatively. 
